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This dissertation focuses on dynamic production and pricing issues related to new
products. Three essays in this dissertation analyze different aspects of the operations
and marketing decisions. The first essay is focused on the dynamic pricing issue for
new product diffusion process when capacity is limited, the second essay is focused
on the production lot sizing decisions for a pharmaceutical firm that manufactures
new medicines for clinical trial, and the third essay deals with outsourcing decisions
when firms manufacture a new product and production costs can be reduced through
“learning-by-doing” effect.
In Essay 1, “New Product Diffusion Decisions Under Supply Constraints,” I study
a capacity constrained firm prices products during new product introductions. Man-
agement of new product introductions is critical for nearly all firms, and one of its
most important dimensions is the management of demand during the introduction.
Research analyzing this area uses predominantly various versions of diffusion model
(Bass 1969) to capture the demand trajectory of a new product with a fixed poten-
tial market. The classical Bass model assumes that price is fixed and capacity is
unlimited. In reality, both factors critically influence firms’ strategies. Price fluctu-
ations for a new product are common and price is often a critical lever that helps
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to shape the demand. Also, often firms have rather significant capacity constraints,
especially during new production introduction times, which influence feasibility of
their strategies.
I assume that the demand rate is influenced by price. When capacity is insufficient,
I allow some customers to either be lost or to be backlogged and, therefore, for the
imitation effect to be delayed. In order to understand the effect of both pricing and
capacity, using control-theory framework (a generalization of the classic Bass model),
I consider the integrated optimal pricing, production, and sales decisions. Most of
the results are fairly robust and apply under the assumption of complete lost sales
and partial backlogging, as well as make to order and make to stock environments.
I show that in most of the cases, the optimal trajectory of demand is unimodal, as
in the Bass model, but the optimal price trajectory can have multiple local maxima
when capacity is limited. Lack of pricing flexibility might lead to intentional creation
of backorders or lost sales, a phenomenon not observed when price adjustments are
allowed. I also explore when pricing flexibility is most valuable using a numerical
study. I find that benefits are highest when capacity is not unlimited nor very little,
and when imitation effect dominates innovation effect. I also find that the capability
to adjust prices is significantly more effective than the option of producing in advance
and holding inventory.
In Essay 2, “Optimal Production and Ordering Policies with Random Yield Pro-
duction and Queueing,” I study lot sizing decisions with random yield, rigid demand
and significant delay costs. The essay is motivated by lot sizing for active ingredi-
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ent production for experimental drugs in the pharmaceutical industry. Clinical trials
require a fairly rigid amount of products, whereas production yields for new drugs
tend to be low and highly variable. Finally, delaying clinical trial is very costly, while
the materials for making the active ingredients are also very expensive. Thus firms
have a major tradeoff: releasing too much material would ensure on-time completion
but waste materials, while releasing too little would delay this drug and potentially
future ones because of compounding of delays.
I model this problem as a lot sizing decision with random yield and rigid demand
in an M/G/1 queue environment. I derive structural results on the optimal policy
and show that under reasonable assumptions about the yield distributions, the op-
timal production quantities are increasing in the number of waiting orders and the
remaining quantity to be produced for the current lot. I also show that the ratio of
the lot size to required amount is decreasing in required quantity.
I conduct a numerical study to compare the optimal average cost with several
heuristic policies commonly used in the industry. The results indicate that in most
cases the simple heuristic policies used in practice are very inefficient and substantial
savings can be obtained by appropriate lot sizing policies.
In an extension, I consider a more complicated model where the firm also has the
choice to outsource certain lots or use overtime and show that optimal policies follow
a threshold structure.
In the third essay, “Make-or-Buy Decisions When Cost Reduction Requires Min-
imum Production Quantity,” I study a problem of outsourcing some or all of the
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production (Make or Buy) in a dynamic setting, where both Manufacturer and his
Supplier may improve their operations and decrease production costs. Such cost re-
ductions, however, require costly effort and are only possible when experimenting with
actual production methods. That is some minimum quantity of production enables
potential improvements. Make or Buy is closely related to the question of dual sourc-
ing, which has been studied before. While various reasons have been provided for
dual sourcing, I provide a new explanation, which is driven by the fact that in-house
production may facilitate learning about potential process improvements leading to
eventual cost reductions.
In a two-period setting, I show that the choice between Manufacturer fully out-
sourcing to the Supplier, fully producing in house, or partial production and partial
outsourcing depends predictably on the cost difference between Manufacturer and
Supplier, but other factors matter as well. I find that dual sourcing is more likely
when the learning process is more uncertain, when Manufacturer’s minimum quantity
required for learning and improvement is larger, or when the two plants incentives
are aligned, e.g., they are part of the same company.
An extension to three periods suggests that it may be optimal to switch back and
forth from full to partial outsourcing. Although Manufacturer has no incentive to
subsidize Supplier’s learning in two periods, in longer horizons the dynamics is more
subtle. On one hand, such incentive may appear, on the other hand, the options to
subsidize may hurt Manufacturer.
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CHAPTER 2
New Product Diffusion Decisions Under Supply
Constraints
2.1 Introduction
We are interested in the joint pricing, sales, and production decisions made by a man-
ufacturer introducing a new product to the market and facing capacity constraints.
Pricing of new products is a critical decision that firms make, and often firms face
capacity constraints that affect their capability to satisfy demand during new product
introductions. We are thus interested in the following groups of questions:
1. How does a firm manage pricing, production, and inventory decisions over
time during new product introductions? What is the structure of optimal pricing,
production and inventory policies? 2. What is the effect of the firm’s capability to
adjust prices? How effective is pricing as a tool to shape demand? How much does
a firm lose if it has to stick to constant prices during a product’s lifetime? 3. What
effect does the firm’s capability to make to stock prior to product introduction have
on its profitability? Is pricing or inventory a more effective tool to maximize profit
and satisfy demand during product introductions?
This setting is directly related to a fundamental stream of research. A classical
model that characterizes demand diffusion dynamics for an innovative product is
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the Bass model (Bass 1969). It assumes that (i) products can be produced in any
quantities and are always available for purchase, and (ii) price is fixed or has no
impact on the diffusion process. In reality, however, these assumptions are often
violated.
While capacity shortages can be observed in many settings, they are quite likely to
occur when new products are introduced to market and the appropriate infrastructure
does not yet exist. Examples of supply shortages for new products are known in
abundance. In December 2005, the Apple Store noted that the 1GB iPod shuffle is
“Currently Unavailable. Sold out for holiday. Expected availability mid-January.”
Similarly, in 2006 Sony announced a shortage of PlayStation 3’s due to insufficient
manufacturing capacity of its key component, blue-laser diode. It is worth noting
that capacity constraints, which are not captured in the classical Bass model, have a
more significant impact on innovative products than they do on mature products. For
an innovative product, not only does capacity shortage result in backlogged demand
or lost sales, it also slows down the product diffusion process, because customers who
have not received the product are not able to generate the positive word-of-mouth
effect.1 Firms clearly need to consider manufacturing capacity and resulting product
availability as critical elements of new product roll-outs.
The other critical factor we focus on is pricing. While prices of all products are
adjusted over time, dynamic changes in prices have potentially big consequences for
new products. Management of such price adjustments can be critical, as recently
1The opposite effect not studied in this paper is the increase of desirability of product driven by
perceived unavailability of products, see Stock and Balachander (2005).
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observed in the introduction of the Apple iPhone. It is common, especially for man-
ufacturers of electronic products, to adjust prices of products several times during
their lifetime.
Given the practical importance of how firms’ pricing, production, and inventory
decisions change in the presence of capacity constraints, we are interested in both the
characteristics of the optimal demand and price trajectories as well as in the choice
of appropriate tools (levers) that can be used to manage this process. Clearly, to
maximize profit when facing capacity shortage, a firm can use multiple tools, some
of which have been analyzed in the existing literature in isolation. For example,
producing in advance of product launch to build early supply has been considered by
Ho et al. (2002), deliberately holding sales to slow down diffusion has been considered
by Kumar and Swaminathan (2003), and changing prices to shape demand during
new product introductions has been widely considered in the marketing literature.
We are interested in how a manufacturer chooses any of these levers when all are
available.
Despite the relevance of these questions, the effect of limited capacity and dynamic
pricing, for new products remains relatively unclear in the research literature and the
choice of tools sometimes even controversial. Qualitatively, capacity makes the pric-
ing/production/selling decisions more complicated, as there is a potential benefit of
influencing demand dynamically with pricing in order to match demand with avail-
able capacity. While there is a wide marketing literature on the role of pricing, it does
not generally consider capacity constraints. The operations literature that deals with
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product introductions does not generally consider pricing. Furthermore, predictions
are sometimes contradictory. E.g., Kumar and Swaminathan (2003), considering a
model where price is not a lever, proved that intentionally holding sales to slow dif-
fusion (i.e., refusing to sell to customers even when the firm has sufficient inventory)
can be optimal, while Ho et al. (2002) suggests that it is never optimal. We resolve
these inconsistencies, when price cannot be adjusted.
Further, we show that analyzing production/inventory decisions without pricing
as a lever can lead to results that fundamentally differ from when pricing can be
used as a lever. We show that the strategy described in Kumar and Swaminathan,
considering a model where price is not a lever, is no longer optimal when price can
be dynamically adjusted. Instead, myopic policy, following the spirit of Ho et al.,
becomes optimal.
Based on the modified Bass demand dynamics that captures capacity constraint
and pricing, we analyze the jointly optimal pricing, sales, and production decisions.
We start with unlimited capacity, and show that both demand and price trajectories
are unimodal over time. For limited capacity, we analyze a sequence of scenarios,
starting from the simplest case of lost sales in make-to-order environment. Later,
we examine the incremental effects of the possibility of holding inventory (make to
stock) and partial backlogging. While the optimal trajectory of demand is unimodal
for most cases (except when backlogging is possible and firm builds to stock), the
optimal price trajectory may be more complicated and multiple local maxima may
be observed. Our results can be interpreted in the framework of skimming and
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penetration pricing strategies. Although multiple local optima may be optimal, our
numerical experiments show that a penetration pricing strategy, widely considered
in marketing literature under infinite-capacity assumptions, is often very close to
optimal under finite capacity as well. Another interesting issue is how much a firm
loses by not being able to change prices during a product’s lifecycle or not being
able to build inventory of the product or not being able to backorder the product.
Our results indicate that pricing is a much more effective tool than inventory or
backordering and losing that the capability to adjust prices affects profits much more
severely than losing the capability to hold inventories or backorder.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we review the relevant
literature. The Bass model is modified to incorporate capacity constraint and pricing
in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4 we analyze pricing decisions when capacity is not
limited, while Section 2.5 analyzes the optimal decisions for the limited capacity
case. We present a numerical study to gain insights into the effectiveness of the
pricing, inventory, and backordering levers in new product introduction, in Section
2.6. Finally, we provide conclusions in Section 2.7.
2.2 Literature Review
Among various demand diffusion models analyzed in marketing literature, the Bass
(1969) model is one of the most recognized. The model describes adoption of new
durable goods and assumes that there are two types of customers, innovative cus-
tomers who make purchasing decisions independent of other customers’ decisions,
and imitative customers whose purchasing decisions are influenced by previous cus-
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tomers through “word-of-mouth” effect. As a result, the instantaneous demand rate









where D(t) is the cumulative demand up to time t, m is the market size (the remaining
potential market size is m − D(t)), p and q are labeled as “innovation coefficient”
and “imitation coefficient” to represent the effects of direct communication and word
of mouth, respectively.2 Since the Bass diffusion model was introduced, it has been
used to describe and forecast demand in various industries. In addition to the original
consumer durable goods markets, these include, e.g., agriculture (Akinola 1986) and
technology (Kalish and Lilien 1986).
The Bass model has been refined and extended in multiple directions, see Ma-
hajan et al. (1990) for a thorough survey. Among those, one particularly relevant
to our work is the influence of pricing on coefficients of innovation and imitation.
Robinson and Lakhani (1975) is among the first papers to incorporate price into dif-
fusion model. They assume that the diffusion rate is modified by e−kp(t), where p(t)
is price at time t and k is a constant, and production cost decreases due to learning-
curve effects. The paper examines a number of intuitive pricing strategies, including
constant price, constant margin pricing, and constant-return-rate pricing. Through
numerical examples, it is shown that all of these strategies can be far from optimality.
2Later literature, e.g., Mahajan et al. (1990), assumes the same functional form, but instead
of labelling customers as innovators or imitators, assumes that individual customer’s adoption, or
probability of purchase, is influenced by two factors: external and internal. External factors might
have the form of direct communications from mass media, such as advertisement. Internal factors
refer to the internal communications between potential customers and customers who have already
purchased.
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This exponential form of price dependence is among the most common (if not the
most common) form of incorporating price in diffusion models and we use it in our
model. There exist, however, some variations in how price has been incorporated into
diffusion models. Some of the papers assume the size of the potential market to be
affected by price, m = m(p), or assume adoption rate to be affected by price, such
as Robinson and Lakhani (1975), Dolan and Jeuland (1981), etc. Other alternative
is to model customer individual behavior as maximizing individual utility functions
(Kalish 1985). Krishnan et al. (1999) propose a Generalized Bass model, where the
price fluctuation rate also affects the adoption rate.
The above studies, as well as several others, disagree on the structure of optimal
pricing strategy. The pricing policies are generally classified into two categories: (i)
skimming, where prices are decreased over time, and (ii) penetration, where low prices
are offered early to attract a broad range of consumers (penetrate market) in order
to create some diffusion-like effects. Usually, in the case of penetration, the price
increases and may eventually decrease. Many of the earlier papers claim that the
optimal price always follows the demand process (e.g. Kalish 1983). Later, Krishnan
et al. (1999) propose a Generalized Bass Model and show that the pricing trajectory
depends on the “discounted price coefficient”, a product of the discount rate and the
diffusion price parameter.
All of the above variants of Bass model assume sufficient availability of products,
i.e., production capacity is never a constraint. We show that co-existence of pric-
ing flexibility and capacity constraint influences the production, as well as pricing
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decisions and that the resulting policies may have different structure than policies
described in the existing literature.
In operations literature there have been several papers that consider the capacity-
constrained diffusion problem. Jain, Mahajan, and Muller (1989) consider a diffusion
model under capacity constraint. They find the demand pattern with limited capac-
ity to be negatively skewed, and empirically verify such behavior using new telephone
market data in Israel. Kumar and Swaminathan (2003) and Ho et al. (2002) inde-
pendently propose models, which include capacity constraint in a diffusion model and
analyze the optimal operational and marketing decisions. Although the two models
differ only in minor details, some of their conclusions are contradictory. Both models
adopt a modified Bass model and assume that only customers who purchased the
product create the word of mouth effect as we do. Also, both models assume partial
backlogging and focus on optimal sales decisions. Ho et al. shows that a myopic
sales policy is always optimal, that is, always satisfy current demand if capacity and
inventory allow for it, while Kumar and Swaminathan shows that not satisfying some
of the demand, i.e., strategically holding sales by denying some customers even when
they can be satisfied by current inventory/capacity, might be optimal in order to
slow down the diffusion process. While the above operations-focused papers incor-
porate capacity constraint, they ignore possibility of using pricing to influence sales.
Dynamic pricing is both used in practice and promising from a conceptual point of
view, since unlike the strategy of holding sales, resulting in backlogging or lost-sale
costs, or the strategy of delaying launching, that delays cash flow, raising price may
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slow down diffusion process without incurring these costs. We re-examine the ex-
isting models and put it in a broader framework with price flexibility. Our model
shows that price flexibility changes the qualitative insights and leads to myopic sales
decisions in settings analyzed in these papers.
Thus, we focus on a diffusion model incorporating both realistic features, capacity
constraints and pricing flexibility, and evaluate appropriate policies that should be
used.
2.3 Model
Consider a diffusion process of a new product with limited capacity. We use a mod-
ification of the Bass diffusion model (Bass 1969), where price, sales, and production
are decision variables that need to be determined during the whole product life cycle.
The Bass model assumes that a new durable product is introduced to a potential










where p is an innovation coefficient and q an imitation coefficient.
Capacity shortage not only results in immediate unsatisfied demand, but also in-
fluences the future diffusion process of demand, because unsatisfied customers cannot
spread product information without having experienced it. We define a sale as when
a customer receives a product. S(t) denotes the cumulative sales at time t. As in
Kumar and Swaminathan (2003) and Ho et al. (2002), only those customers who
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have received the product can be the source of the word-of-mouth effect. (In the case
when backlogs are allowed, we assume that backlogged customers start generating
word of mouth only when they have received the product.)
We make three assumptions about customer behavior:
1. We do not model detailed customer strategic purchasing behavior. Some cus-
tomers may be acting strategically and waiting for lower prices and some cus-
tomers may not. We assume that d(t) represents the overall demand we face as
a function of the price we set.
2. If the firm is not able to fully satisfy demand at time t, a fraction ξ of the un-
satisfied customers is backlogged with backlogging cost b per customer per unit
time. Backlogged customers wait until they obtain the product, while the rest
of the customers leave and never return. A complete lost sale case is captured
by ξ = 0 and a complete backlogging case by ξ = 1. For backlogged customers,
it is critical to specify which price is charged. We assume that customers pay
the price when they place orders and the firm collects the payment immedi-
ately,3 but backlogged customers are not included in the total number of sales,
S(t), that generates the word of mouth effect.
3. When the firm produces new units, backlogged customers are given priority
over new customers in receiving the product. All backorders are satisfied at the
end of horizon t = T at production cost.
During a finite horizon [0, T ], a firm with fixed capacity K determines price π(t),
3If customers paid the price at the time they receive the product, this could be easily gamed
by the retailer. E.g., the retailer could accumulate high backlog and then force the backlogged
customers to pay an extremely high price.
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sales rate s(t), and instantaneous production rate x(t), in order to maximize total
discounted profit with discount factor r ≥ 0. Production incurs linear cost c and
excess inventory I(t) is stored with linear holding cost h.
We assume that the price for the product at time t, π(t), influences both the
innovation coefficient p and imitation coefficient q in the same fashion, i.e., p(π) =
pe−θπ, and q(π) = qe−θπ, as is typically assumed in the marketing literature (e.g.,
Dolan and Jeuland 1981, and Robinson and Lakhani 1975). To make the proofs
easier to follow, we use θ = 1.4 Thus, the production rate is constrained by capacity
















[m−D(t)] and, therefore, d(t) = dB(t)e−π(t). Clearly
π(t) = log dB(t)− log d(t).
A discrete analog of our model would have the following interpretation. In period
t, the firm’s starting inventory is I(t) and backlog is W (t). The firm decides to
produce quantity x(t), subject to capacity constraint K, and sets price π(t) and
observes demand d(t). It decides that it will sell a quantity s(t) that cannot exceed
x(t) + I(t). Any left product becomes inventory in the next period I(t + 1). If
s(t) < W (t)+d(t), backlogged customers from period t are satisfied first and a fraction
of the new customers ξ[d(t) − (s(t) − W (t))+] become the backlogged customers
W (t + 1) for period t + 1.
We analyze the continuous-time model. In this model, we determine at all points
4Proofs for θ 6= 1 are similar and do not change the structure of optimal demand and price.
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in time t, the price level π(t) and the production rate x(t). The price level determines
the demand rate d(t) we observe and we also determine what sales rate s(t) to allow.
We first focus on the instantaneous revenue collected at time t. Because backlogging
has higher priority than new demand, there are no sales to new customers as long as
backlog remains positive, W (t) > 0, i.e., each unit of production is immediately used
to satisfy a backlogged customer and thus revenue is collected at a rate of ξπ(t)d(t).
(This is because we assume backlogged customers had already paid, and we only
collect revenues from new customers who agree to be backlogged). If W (t) = 0,
then s(t) + ξ[d(t)− s(t)] customers will purchase, among whom ξ[d(t)− s(t)] will be
backlogged, and the collected revenue is π(t)[s(t) + ξ(d(t) − s(t))]. Once again, we
assume that at time T , all backlogs are satisfied and any remaining inventory can be








ξd(t) + (1− ξ)s(t)1{W (t)=0}
]
− cx(t)− hI(t)

















= x(t)− s(t), (2.5)
dW
dt
= ξd(t)− s(t) + (1− ξ)s(t)1{W (t)=0}, (2.6)
I(t) ≥ 0,W (t) ≥ 0, 0 ≤ x(t) ≤ K, 0 ≤ s(t)1{W (t)=0} ≤ d(t), (2.7)
D(0) = S(0) = I(0) = W (0) = 0. (2.8)
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The objective function (2.1) includes the revenue rate for new customers minus pro-
duction cost, inventory holding cost, and backlogging cost. (2.2) describes the diffu-
sion process. Equations (2.3-2.6) define cumulative demand, cumulative sales, inven-
tory and backlogging dynamics. When backlog W (t) = 0, it (potentially) increases
at a rate of ξ[d(t)− s(t)], otherwise with positive backlog, fraction ξ of new demand
is backlogged, while new production is used for previously backlogged demand. Con-
straints (2.7) require nonnegative inventory, nonnegative backlogging, production not
to exceed available capacity, and sales rate smaller than demand rate in case of no
backlog. Note that the constraints for s(t), when backlog occurs, are implicitly given
by equations (2.5-2.7). Equation (2.8) provides the initial conditions. All models we
consider are a special case of this general formulation.
2.4 Infinite Capacity
Before analyzing the case with both capacity constraint and dynamic pricing, we start
with the problem with infinite capacity. We show that in this case, both demand and
price trajectories have unimodal structures, and the demand peak (as a function of
time) precedes the price peak, when the discount factor r is positive.5
Clearly, holding inventory is expensive and its only purpose is to hedge against fu-
ture capacity shortage. Therefore, under infinite capacity, we will not hold inventory.
Also, strategically backlogging some demand slows down the diffusion process and
would only be useful when capacity is insufficient. Using price adjustments, we can
decrease the sales (slow down the diffusion) and achieve higher profit. Thus, myopic
5Without discounting, the optimal demand is flat over the time horizon, see Lemma 4.
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In order to solve this control-theory problem, we use Hamiltonian H, which after
incorporating factor ert into λ(t) becomes:
H(D, d, λ, t) = (log dB(t)− log d(t)− c)d(t) + λ(t)d(t)
Notice that, because S(t) = D(t), dB(t) is unimodal (negative quadratic) in D, and
because D(t) is non-decreasing in t, we have that dB(t) is unimodal in t, and reaches
its peak at time τB, such that D(τB) = (q − p)m
2q
. In the following lemmas, we
show that the optimal demand and price are both unimodal in time, as illustrated
in Figure 2.1. We further characterize conditions under which demand and price are
monotonically increasing, monotonically decreasing, or increasing-decreasing. Finally,
we demonstrate that, in the presence of positive discount factor, the demand peak
always precedes the price peak.
Lemma 1 Assume discount factor r > 0 and capacity K = +∞. Then, the optimal
demand d∗(t) is unimodal over time. It increases on [0, T ] if the optimal cumulative
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demand D∗(T ) < (q − p)m
2q
, decreases if D∗(T ) ≥ (q − p)m
2q
and λ(0) ≤ 0, and is
increasing-decreasing otherwise.
Lemma 2 When discount factor r > 0 and capacity K = +∞, the optimal price
π∗(t) is unimodal over time. It increases on [0, T ] if D∗(T ) < (q − p)m
2q
, decreases if
D∗(T ) ≥ (q − p)m
2q
and rλ(0)− (q − p)e−π∗(0) ≥ 0, and is increasing-decreasing oth-
erwise.
Lemmas 1 and 2 describe the shape of demand and price trajectories when capacity
is not limited and when discount factor is positive. Note first that the conditions for
demand and price to be increasing over the whole horizon are the same (D∗(T ) <
(q − p)m
2q
), which is most likely when the time horizon T is relatively short. If the
selling season is long enough, usually both demand and price will eventually start
decreasing.
Second, given the price and demand decrease at the end of the horizon, the lem-
mas describe, whether initial increase may take place or they decrease throughout
the whole horizon. Clearly, demand decreases throughout the selling season if the
marginal benefit of cumulative demand is already negative at the beginning of hori-
zon (λ(0) ≤ 0), i.e., when the saturation effect already exceeds the diffusion effect.
This typically takes place in a market with strong innovation effect (p) and weak
imitation effect (q). The condition for price to drop throughout the time horizon
typically requires a small discount factor and very weak imitation effect (q). A small
discount factor ensures that it is not necessary to offer promotional price at the very











Figure 2.1. Optimal demand and price with unlimited capacity.
shrinking and thus price cut is needed later on.
Let τd and τπ denote the time at which we reach the maximum (peak) of demand
and of price, respectively. We show that they satisfy the following relationship.
Lemma 3 When discount factor r > 0 and capacity K = +∞, the peaks of optimal
demand, and price are ordered as follows: τd ≤ τπ. Furthermore, assume that the firm
does not have pricing flexibility, and is forced to set the same fixed price πF for all
times t ≤ T . Consider any constant price and let the time at which the peak demand
is reached under the constant price be τF . Then we have that τd ≤ τF ≤ τπ.
With infinite capacity and positive discount factor, the firm prefers collecting
revenue earlier, thus would like to stimulate the diffusion at a faster pace, making
demand trajectory more negatively skewed.
Without discounting the profit, optimal demand and price can be derived in
closed-form.
Lemma 4 If discount factor r = 0 and capacity K = +∞, then for all t ∈ [0, T ],
demand rate is constant, while price is correspondingly adjusted over time:




−(p− q)T − e1+c +
√
((p− q)T + e1+c)2 + 4pqT 2
}
π(t) = 1 + c + log
(m− d̄t)(p + qd̄t/m)
(m− d̄T )(p + qd̄T/m) (2.9)
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Furthermore, price is decreasing on [0, T ] if and only if q < p.
Without discounting, the price structure is similar to that in Dolan and Jeuland
(1981). Surprisingly, the optimal demand remains flat over the time horizon.6 That
is, the firm should modify the price, according to (2.9), to maintain constant demand.
This may contradict the intuitive expectation that the firm might want to set a
constant price over the whole time horizon when profit is not discounted. However,
since the firm’s myopic profit rate at time t is given by (π(t) − c)d(t) = (π(t) −
c)(m − D(t))(p + qD(t)/m)e−π(t), constant price π(t) = 1 + c maximizes only the
firm’s myopic profit, while ignoring the indirect effect of pricing on future product
diffusion. This indirect effect takes place through cumulative demand. For example,
a low price drives a faster increase in cumulative demand. Fast increase in cumulative
demand is desirable at the beginning of the time horizon, as it translates into needed
word-of-mouth effect, not desirable in the middle phase due to market saturation,
and eventually not critical at the end of the time horizon. Therefore, if the time
horizon is long enough, the firm first stimulates word-of-mouth effect through a low
price, then charges a higher price, and a low price at the end of the life cycle to clear
the market. Consequently, the demand should be much flatter than the case where
the firm is forced to set a constant price for the whole time horizon.
It is easy to verify that π(t) peaks at
q − p
2aq/m
. Therefore, price is decreasing
throughout the whole life cycle (skimming) if and only if q < p, i.e., if imitation
effect is dominated by innovation effect. Otherwise, we see initial penetration. This
is easy to understand in the extreme case: without any imitators, q = 0, all sales are
6Dolan and Jeuland (1981) assume no discounting, but do not analyze the demand function.
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driven by the innovators and, since the remaining market size decreases, the price
correspondingly decreases. (The same logic applies to the general q < p case.)
Note that the lemma above has immediate implications for the interactions of
marketing and operations in new product markets with fairly small discount rates.
Obviously, the analysis of unlimited-capacity case applies to all cases where capacity is
simply sufficient (not constraining the demand trajectory). Given that the “optimal”
diffusion implies constant demand, a direct lesson is that the firm would build a
facility which would serve a fairly constant demand over time, while all potential
non-stationarities are absorbed by the pricing policy. The interesting fact here is that
although it is generally recommended in the operations literature to level demand to
help operations, in this case, it turns out to be optimal even when operations do not
create a constraint. If discounting is significant, however, the firm is more impatient
to satisfy customers and stimulates demand more aggressively in the early phase of
product life cycle.
2.5 Limited Capacity
For the rest of the paper, we consider the more general situation, when capacity is
constrained. We start with a case of lost sale and no inventory. In the following sub-
sections, we incorporate inventory and backorders in the model. Recall that Kumar
and Swaminathan (2003) allow for constrained capacity, but assume constant price.
Their paper suggests that strategically holding sales to slow the diffusion of demand
can be optimal. That is the firm may decide not to sell the product, even when hold-
ing some inventory of the product. We show that this never happens with dynamic
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pricing, which emphasizes the strategic importance of pricing in new product intro-
ductions. The joint decisions of production quantity, sales level, and pricing makes
the problem more complicated and we first describe the optimal demand and price
trajectories. We will do this first for the case where unsatisfied demand is assumed
to be completely lost and then for the most general case where partial backlogging is
allowed.
2.5.1 Optimal demand and price trajectories under lost sales
We will now characterize the optimal pricing, production and sales trajectories over
time. In this subsection, we assume that all unsatisfied demand is lost. We first
characterize the optimal trajectories for the make-to-order case. Thus ξ = 0, x(t) =
s(t), and W (t) = I(t) = 0.
Under make-to-order, our assumption is that if the demand rate for arriving cus-
tomers exceeds our capacity rate, we experience lost sales. Clearly, lost sales cannot
be optimal when we can control pricing. Note that allowing demand to be higher
than available capacity results in lost sales, reduces future potential market, and does
not create word-of-mouth effect. Thus, the firm is better off raising prices to reduce
demand, which increases revenues and does not reduce future market potential.
Lemma 5 Assume products are made-to-order and unsatisfied demand is completely
lost. The optimal production, sales, and demand are equal and never exceed capacity,
i.e., x∗(t) = s∗(t) = d∗(t) ≤ K.












Figure 2.2. Optimal policies with complete lost sale in make-to-order environment










0 ≤ d(t) ≤ K, D(0) = 0.
Theorem 1 Assume that products are made to order and unsatisfied demand is com-
pletely lost. There exist time thresholds 0 ≤ tA1 ≤ tA2 ≤ T , such that
(a) Optimal demand d∗(t) increases on (0, tA1 ), d
∗(t) = K on (tA1 , t
A
2 ), and decreases on
(tA2 , T ).




2 ), and unimodal on
(tA2 , T ).
(c) There exists K̄ such that tA1 = t
A
2 for all K ≥ K̄.
Theorem 1 states that, when capacity is insufficient, the optimal demand tra-
jectory becomes “truncated unimodal” (there still exists only one demand peak but
when this demand peak is equal to the firm’s capacity, demand may equal capacity
for an interval), while optimal price can be bimodal. Let τA1 and τ
A
2 be the two
price peaks. We can, accordingly, divide product life cycle into five phases as shown
in Figure 2.2. In Phase I, (0, tA1 ), the product has been just introduced with no or
24
minimal word of mouth. Thus, demand is low and a low promotion price is offered
in order to boost demand. This behavior continues until demand reaches capacity.
In Phase II, (tA1 , τ
A
1 ), the firm’s demand has picked up and may exceed its capacity.
To avoid this, the firm raises the price in order to bring the demand rate down to its
capacity rate. In Phase III, (τA1 , t
A
2 ), a noticeable portion of the market has already
been penetrated and the need for price premium to keep demand at the capacity level
is first increased and then reduced. In Phase IV, (tA2 , τ
A
2 ), demand drops to a level
where it is not necessary to increase prices to maintain sales at the capacity level.
Since the effect of the word of mouth is less significant in this phase, the firm may
in fact raise prices, as in case with infinite capacity. Finally, in Phase V, (τA2 , T ),
the remaining market is very small, demand is decreasing and clearance prices are
charged.
When capacity is sufficiently large, part (c) indicates that the constrained phase
(tA1 , t
A
2 ) disappears, and the price and demand trajectories are identical to those de-
rived in the infinite capacity case.
Theorem 1 indicates that limited capacity significantly affects the structure of the
pricing policy. Although the optimal demand behavior is similar to the classical Bass
diffusion model, the optimal price is not unimodal anymore. The firm may charge a
penetration price, and then charge a premium (possibly interpreted as “skimming”)
price when demand is high to bring it down to the capacity level. (Skimming would
be strictly driven by limited capacity.) In later stages, when demand falls below
capacity, it might be optimal to increase price again.
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Having characterized the structure of optimal trajectories for the make-to-order
case, we now extend our results to the make-to-stock case. We show that it is optimal
for the firm to produce at the demand rate for an interval of time, and then to switch
to producing at full capacity at a threshold time to build excess inventory. The firm
uses this excess inventory to satisfy demand during the time when demand will exceed
capacity. (Since inventory is allowed to be built, demand can exceed capacity at a
certain interval of time.) The optimal price trajectory remains bimodal.
Previously, when holding inventory was not allowed, we had demand, production,
and sales rates equal, x∗(t) = s∗(t) = d∗(t) ≤ K. When carrying inventory is allowed,
the production rate can exceed the sales rate, x∗(t) ≥ s∗(t), and also the sales rate
may exceed capacity when using inventory to satisfy demand, s∗(t) ≥ K. While the
model allows demand to exceed sales, we once again show that this can never occur
under an optimal policy, i.e., there will be no lost sales.
Lemma 6 Assume a make-to-stock environment with complete lost sales. Then
d∗(t) = s∗(t), for all t.






















I(t) ≥ 0, I(0) = 0,
0 ≤ x(t) ≤ K,
D(0) = 0.
The Hamiltonian for this problem is:
H(D, I, d, x, λ1, λ2, t) = (log dB(t)− log d(t))d(t)− cx(t)− hI(t)
+λ1d(t) + λ2(x(t)− d(t)) (2.10)
By Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, the optimal demand and production pair (d∗(t),
x∗(t)) maximizes H subject to constraints I(t) ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ x(t) ≤ K. For any given
λ1 and λ2, partial derivatives of H w.r.t. d(t) and x(t) are:
∂H
∂d
= log dB(t)− log d(t)− 1 + λ1(t)− λ2(t)
∂H
∂x
= −c + λ2(t)
We note that λ1(t) can be interpreted as the discounted shadow price of the
cumulative demand and λ2(t) can be interpreted as the discounted shadow price of
inventory.
Due to the constraint on the state variable I(t), the analysis in this case is more
complicated than that of make-to-order case in two aspects. First, the terminal value
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λ2(T ) is not necessarily 0, but can take any nonnegative values, since remaining
inventory at the end of the horizon can have some salvage value. Second, λ2(t)
may be discontinuous. When the state constraint becomes binding, i.e., when I(t)
transitions from positive to zero, λ2(t) can have a downward jump.
Lemma 7 For an open interval: (a) If I∗(t) > 0, then almost everywhere x∗(t) = K
and λ2(t) ≥ c. (b) If I∗(t) = 0, then almost everywhere x∗(t) = d(t).
Intuitively, Lemma 7(a) states that a firm cannot produce less than its capacity
and hold inventory at the same time. If a firm has inventory at the moment, and is
producing less than capacity, it would have been better off by shifting some production
from a previous time to the present. By doing so, demand can still be satisfied while
production cost is delayed and inventory cost is decreased. For part (b), simply note
that if inventory remains 0 for any open interval, production and demand must be
equal.
Using similar logic, we show that it is not optimal to have positive inventory at
the end of the horizon, since the excess inventory at the end of the horizon is of no
use to the firm, while incurring extra holding cost and production cost.
Lemma 8 There is no inventory left at the end of the horizon, i.e., I∗(T ) = 0.
Therefore, the optimal decisions, can be characterized as a function of inventory
and the coefficients λ1(t) and λ2(t).
Lemma 9 Given I(t), λ1(t), and λ2(t), the optimal demand and production quanti-
ties are:
1. If I∗(t) > 0, then λ2(t) ≥ c, x∗(t) = K, and log d∗(t) = log dB(t)− 1 + λ1(t)− λ2(t).
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2. If I∗(t) = 0 and λ2(t) ≥ c, then x∗(t) = K, log d∗(t) = min{log K, log dB(t) − 1 +
λ1(t)− λ2(t)}.
3. If I∗(t) = 0 and λ2(t) < c, then x∗(t) = d∗(t), log d∗(t) = min{log K, log dB(t)− 1 +
λ1(t)− c}.
The production strategy is determined by the discounted shadow price of inven-
tory λ2. When λ2 is greater than the production cost, the firm produces as much
as possible, which is full capacity. If λ2 is smaller than the production cost, it is
not beneficial to fully utilize capacity. In that case, the firm’s production perfectly
matches its current demand.
We are now ready to describe the whole trajectory of price, demand, and produc-
tion.
Theorem 2 In a make-to-stock environment (with holding cost h < +∞), there exist
time thresholds 0 ≤ tB1 ≤ tB2 ≤ tB3 ≤ T , such that





∗(t) = K on
(tB2 , t
B
3 ), and decreases on (t
B
3 , T ).




3 ), and is unimodal on
(tB3 , T ).
(c) Optimal production x∗(t) = d∗(t) on (0, tB1 ) ∪ (tB3 , T ), and x∗(t) = K on (tB1 , tB3 ).
Inventory I∗(t) > 0 and is unimodal on (tB1 , t
B
2 ) and 0 otherwise.
Theorem 2, illustrated in Figure 2.3, states that with the ability to hold stock, the
optimal demand and price trajectories are similar to those of make-to-order product,
except for an intermediate phase (tB1 , t
B
2 ). At t
B
1 , demand is still below capacity, but












Figure 2.3. Optimal policies with complete lost sale in make-to-stock environment
at some time exceeds the firm’s capacity and inventory is naturally depleted. At tB2 ,
inventory is sold out and the firm continues selling at capacity rate in time interval
(tB2 , t
B
3 ). Finally, demand drops below capacity after t
B
3 . Essentially, the ability to
hold inventory allows the firm to start producing larger amounts than demand early
on so that it can sell more than what it is producing at a later time. Thus, pricing
does not negate the need for inventory build-up. However, in this case, with pricing,
we do not have to resort to withholding sales whereby we turn away customers even
though we have inventory, which implies qualitatively different results from those of
Kumar and Swaminathan (2003).
2.5.2 Optimal demand, and price trajectories under partial backlogging
When unsatisfied demand is completely lost, we showed that price is used to shape
demand so that demand always equals sales and is never lost. We were also able to
characterize the demand, price, and inventory trajectories. Consider now the most
general case with partial backlogging and inventory - as defined in Section 2.3. In
this general setting, the optimal demand can indeed exceed sales, resulting in some
backlogged customers. We show that before any backlog appears, the firm builds
some inventory and uses it when demand exceeds capacity (as in Section 2.5.1).
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After inventory is depleted, selling more than capacity may continue, and the excess
demand will be then backlogged. After demand drops below capacity level, the
firm will continue to produce at full capacity level until the backlogged demand is
cleared. We will first characterize the structure of the production and sales policies
and compare them to those derived in Kumar and Swaminathan (2003) and Ho et al.
(2002). What we will show is that, with pricing as an available option, a myopic sales
policy that sells all the available inventory up to demand at any time is optimal. This
is the policy derived in Ho without pricing as an available option, but we will in fact
derive a counterexample to show that Ho’s conclusion is invalid without pricing as an
available control and that, as Kumar and Swaminathan predicted, without pricing, it
is potentially optimal for the firm to withhold sales even if it is capable of satisfying
the demand, something that would never happen with dynamic pricing.
We consider here the non-trivial case of partial or full backlog, 0 < ξ ≤ 1 (lost sale
ξ = 0 has already been analyzed in the previous sections). The problem formulation
is exactly the same as in equations (2.1-2.8) and the Hamiltonian depends on whether
the backlog is positive:
1. If W (t) = 0:
H(D,S, I, W, d, x, s, λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, t) = (log dB(t)− log d(t))(ξd(t) + (1− ξ)s(t))
−cx(t)− hI(t)− bW (t) + λ1(t)d(t) + λ2(t)s(t) + λ3(t)(x(t)− s(t))
+λ4(t)ξ(d(t)− s(t))
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2. If W (t) > 0:
H(D,S, I, W, d, x, s, λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, t) = (log dB(t)− log d(t))ξd(t)− cx(t)
−hI(t)− bW (t) + λ1(t)d(t) + λ2(t)s(t) + λ3(t)(x(t)− s(t))
+λ4(t)(ξd(t)− s(t))
It is possible to interpret λ1, λ2, λ3, and λ4 as, respectively, the discounted shadow
prices of cumulative demand, cumulative sales, inventory, and backorders. We first
show that it is not possible to have, at the same time, backlogged customer and
positive inventory (as it is beneficial to use inventory to immediately satisfy backlog).
To avoid trivialities, we assume that b > rc, which implies that the backlogging
cost is higher than what the firm can save by postponing production a unit of time. If
this does not hold, the firm may have an incentive to intentionally delay all production
till the end of the horizon.
Lemma 10 (a) If I∗(t) > 0 on an open interval, then W ∗(t) = 0, x∗(t) = K and
s∗(t) = d∗(t) almost everywhere.
(b) If b > rc and W ∗(t) > 0 on an open interval, then I∗(t) = 0, x∗(t) = s∗(t) = K
almost everywhere.
(c) If I∗(t) = W ∗(t) = 0 on an open interval, then x∗(t) = s∗(t) = d∗(t) almost
everywhere.
The lemma above states that although backlogging is possible, deliberately back-
logging demand when inventories are available or capacity is sufficient, as shown
optimal in Kumar and Swaminathan (2003), is no longer optimal when price is dy-
namically adjusted. Inventory, if available, is used to immediately clear any backo-
32
rders and, by the same token, if no inventory is available, then the firm uses current
production to satisfy the backorders rather than build any inventory. Lemma 10
confirms that the production strategy used in Lemma 7 continues to hold when back-
logging is allowed, that is, the firm produces at full capacity if it is optimal to keep
positive inventory on hand.
Recall that in two previous papers, Kumar and Swaminathan and Ho et al. ob-
tained conflicting results about the optimality of delaying sales in models where price
is fixed. Kumar and Swaminathan showed that delaying sales can be optimal while in
Proposition 1 of their paper, Ho et al., claimed that a myopic policy that never delays
sales is always optimal as long as the firm has positive profit margins, and positive
holding costs. Thus, Ho et al. claimed that it is never optimal for a firm to carry
inventory and backlog (or turn away) customers at the same time while Kumar and
Swaminathan showed the opposite. We provide a counter example that contradicts
the conclusion of Proposition 1 in Ho et al.
To explain the counterexample, we first need to explain two variables that Ho et
al. use in their model. First, they define a launch time tl, where product is launched
and demand diffusion can begin. Inventory, however, can be built before product
launch. In our model, we can always achieve that by setting prices arbitrarily high,
so that demand equals zero for some initial period of time. Thus, we do not need this
additional variable. Ho et al. also allow backlogged customers to wait for an average
of 1/l units of time before departing the system. Our counter example to Ho et al.’s
result uses the following parameters: p = 0.03, q = 0.4,m = 3000, K=100, discount
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factor r = 0.01, holding cost h = 0.001, profit margin a(t) = 1.3 (a(t) = π(t) − c in
our setting) for all t, complete lost sales, so 1/l = 0 (where 1/l is the average time
that a backlogged customer will wait before departing the system) launch time tl = 0.
These parameter values satisfy the condition of Proposition 1 in Ho et al. Solving the
continuous time equation that these parameters result in (equations (11-16) in Ho et
al.), we obtain the profit under the myopic sales policy which never delays sales to
be 2270.07. However, we consider an alternative policy under which we intentionally
delay sales by τ = 5 time units. That is, for t ∈ [0, τ ] = [0, 5], customers come
to purchase, but the firm does not sell to them even if inventory is available. For
t ≥ τ a myopic sales policy is used. We obtain a profit of 2311.92. (Please see the
Appendix for the derivation of profits.) Therefore, in this case a myopic sales policy
is dominated by a policy that delays sales even when the firm has inventory. This is
exactly what Kumar and Swaminathan showed.
This counterexample suggests that the myopic sales policy suggested in Ho et al.
is not an optimal policy when price cannot be dynamically adjusted. In our coun-
terexample, the firm has a small discount factor so delaying sales does not hurt profit
very significantly. When capacity is limited, delaying sales slows down the diffusion
process, thus reducing further sale losses from a sudden onslaught of demand that
exceeds capacity. Our setting differs in that our model allows dynamic price changes,
and we find that myopic sales policy is optimal when pricing flexibility is available.
Clearly, when the firm has pricing flexibility, it can adjust price to control the diffu-
sion process, without incurring the cost of losing sales. Therefore, pricing flexibility
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acts as another lever to hedge against capacity shortage. An interesting question is
how powerful pricing is as a tool compared to delaying sales or building inventory in
advance by delaying the launching of the process as Kumar and Swaminathan and
Ho et al. allow. We explore these questions in the next section.
We conclude this section by characterizing the optimal demand and price trajec-
tories for the most general setting with partial backorders. We show that there is
at most one backlogging interval, and the optimal price trajectory has at most three
modes.
Theorem 3 In a make-to-stock environment with partial backlogging, if b > rc, and
if demand is continuous, then there is at most one backordering interval, and the
optimal price has at most three local maxima. There exist time thresholds 0 ≤ tC1 ≤
tC2 ≤ tC3 ≤ tC4 ≤ T , such that
(a) Optimal demand d∗(t) ≤ K and increases on (0, tC1 ), d∗(t) is unimodal on (tC1 , tC2 ),
d∗(t) = K on (tC2 , t
C
3 ), d
∗(t) is unimodal on (tC3 , t
C
4 ), and d
∗(t) ≤ K and decreases on
(tC4 , T ).




4 ), and (t
C
4 , T ).
(c) Optimal production x∗(t) = d∗(t) on (0, tC1 ) ∪ (tC4 , T ), and x∗(t) = K on (tC1 , tC4 ).
Inventory I(t) > 0 and is unimodal on (tC1 , t
C
2 ).
(d) Optimal sales s∗(t) = d∗(t) on (0, tC3 ) ∪ (tC4 , T ), and s∗(t) = K on (tC3 , tC4 ). Backlog
W (t) > 0 on (tC3 , t
C
4 ).
In the special case where the product is made to order (holding cost h = +∞), then
tC1 = t
C
2 and the optimal demand trajectory is unimodal over time on [0, T ], and the
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Figure 2.4. Optimal demand, inventory and
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Figure 2.5. Optimal price trajectories with make
to stock and partial backordering
The option of backorders, either partial or full, complicates the firm’s pricing
strategies. A typical situation is shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5, where the selling season
includes a positive inventory period and a positive backorder period. Parameters used
are m = 3000, p = 0.03, q = 0.4, c = 70, α = 0.05, β = 0.9, h = 0.01, w = 0.01, T = 50,
where β is the discrete discount factor corresponding to r in continuous time. During
the positive inventory period, the firm first produces at full capacity to build up
some inventory while capacity is sufficient, and then sell more than capacity using
the inventory prepared. After inventory is depleted, the firm may sell at capacity
level for a while. And then, when the firm anticipates that the capacity-constrained
phase will end in the near future, it may decide to sell more than it can offer (from
inventory or from production) and hold some of the excess demand as backorders.
Theorem 3 indicates that a tri-modal price may be a possibility while Figure
2.5 shows an example with a bimodal price. (We have actually not succeeded in
creating a numerical example with a tri-modal pricing structure). However, in the
marketing literature and in fact in practice, it is not that easy to see products that
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had a trimodal or even a bimodal pricing structure during their life cycle. As we
stated in the introduction, the most commonly encountered pricing structures are
skimming pricing where the prices only decrease over time and penetration pricing
which essentially is unimodal. In fact, our numerical results in the next section
indicate that penetration pricing is very close to optimal when used in conjunction
with optimal inventory and production policies,
2.6 Numerical Study
In the last section, we have characterized the optimal demand, price, inventory and
backorder trajectories under different situations. Although the firm can use price,
preparing inventory, or allowing backorders to hedge against capacity shortage, it is
not clear how effective these tools are. We conduct numerical study to compare the
benefit of these tools.
We have shown that the optimal price trajectory has a complicated bimodal (or
potentially tri-modal) structure. The interesting question is how much benefit the
firm has gained from using this complicated structure as opposed to simpler struc-
tures, which we also investigate in this section.
Similar to Kumar and Swaminathan (2003), we solve the discrete-time version of
the continuous-time model. For all results presented in this section, unless otherwise
stated, we use the following parameters: m = 3000, p = 0.03, q = 0.4, c = 0.5,
r = 0.1, h = 0.01, b = 0.005, ξ = 1, and T = 50 periods.
• Value of pricing flexibility.
Pricing flexibility acts as a lever to hedge against capacity shortage. We define
37
the value of pricing flexibility as
Optimal profit with dynamic pricing− Profit with the optimal fixed price
Profit with the optimal fixed price
×100%
Figure 2.6 shows that, as capacity increases, the value of pricing flexibility first
increases and then decreases and, thus, it is most beneficial when the firm’s
capacity is in the intermediate range. Intuitively, if the firm has sufficient
capacity, demand is seldom constrained and thus price, while actively used, has
moderate variation, driven solely by revenue maximization. When the firm has
low capacity, demand is always constrained, so use of price is very important,
but it is used solely to shape demand to fit available capacity and, therefore,
price does not vary dramatically. In-between, both of these reasons exist and
the seller more actively accelerates and decelerates demand to maximize revenue
and take advantage of slack capacity in the beginning and the end of product










Figure 2.6. Value of pricing flexibility as a func-









Figure 2.7. Value of holding inventory as a func-
tion of capacity K and imitation factor q
Figure 2.6 also shows that the value of pricing flexibility increases in the imi-
tation factor q. As the customers are more easily influenced by other people’s
purchases, a low promotion price can create a significant word-of-mouth effect
38
and thus is more helpful.
• Value of holding inventory. Figure 2.7 shows the value of holding inventory,
which is defined similarly, as the percentage profit increase from make-to-order
environment to make-to-stock environment. Similar to the value of pricing
flexibility, the value of holding inventory is also highest for intermediate range of
capacity. However, compared to value of pricing flexibility (20%-50%), value of
holding inventory is very small (0-0.2%), which implies that carrying inventory
does not help much when price adjustments are a viable tool, even for a firm
with potential capacity constraints.
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Figure 2.9. Optimality gap of skimming pricing
strategies
Figure 2.8 illustrates the value of allowing backorders, defined as the percentage
profit increase when backlogging is allowed as compared to the complete lost
sales case. The value of allowing backorders is typically larger than that of
holding inventory, and it decreases in capacity. Clearly, when capacity is large,
backorders/lostsale do not occur very often. When capacity is small, it may,
however, be significant, as shown in Figure 2.8. Similarly, it is higher for bigger
imitation factors, q.
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• Comparison of the optimal pricing strategy with simple pricing strategies
Although the marketing literature has suggested that the optimal price should
have either a skimming or a penetration structure, they have assumed that the
firm has infinite capacity. We have shown that when the firm has capacity
constraints, the optimal pricing strategies may have a complicated structure.
However, implementing such a complicated dynamic pricing structure may be
difficult and explaining it to customers may be even harder. Therefore, we com-
pare the optimal pricing strategy with the simple pricing strategies suggested
in the marketing literature (when those simple policies are used in conjunction
with optimal production/inventory policies) and examine the profit implica-
tions.
We define a skimming pricing strategy as the price decreasing over time, and
a penetration pricing strategy as the price increasing and then decreasing over
time, thus the penetration pricing trajectory is unimodal. We define the opti-
mality gap for skimming price as:
Profit with the optimal price− Profit with the optimal skimming price
Profit with the optimal skimming price
.
Similarly, we define the optimality gap for penetration price as:
Profit with the optimal price− Profit with the optimal penetration price
Profit with the optimal penetration price
.
Figures 2.9 and 2.10 show the optimality gaps for skimming and penetration
price policies, respectively. The parameters used are m = 3000, p = 0.03, q =
0.3, c = 0.05, r = 0.1, h = 0, b = 0.01, ξ = 1, T = 50. We can see that for
40
some parameters, skimming pricing strategy still does not perform very well,
and the profit difference can be 10% to 30%, although the profit difference is
smaller when the firm also has other levers such as holding inventory and al-
lowing backorders. On the other hand, the penetration strategy performs very
close to the optimal strategy. This is very encouraging since we have shown
that even though the optimal price trajectory may have multiple modes, the
simple unimodal strategy, suggested in marketing literature without capacity
constraints, actually works well in the situation of capacity constraints. There-
fore, managers can avoid the frustration of using a complicated pricing policy as
long as they focus on coordinating optimal production/inventory policies with
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Figure 2.10. Optimality gap of penetration pricing strategies
2.7 Conclusions
In this work, we analyzed a capacity-constrained firm introducing a new product
and making decisions about how to price and manufacture the product for the most
profitable diffusion of the product into the marketplace. Our model generalizes Kumar
and Swaminathan (2003) and Ho et al. (2002) by incorporating price decisions. As
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multiple decisions about production, sales, and pricing interact with each other, we
examined these interactions in several situations, starting from the simplest ones, to
eventually include complete lost sales and partial backlogging, and make-to-order and
make-to-stock environments.
While marketing literature had considered pricing decisions, it had typically ig-
nored capacity constraints. Our first contribution was to derive the structure of
integrated pricing, production and inventory policies under capacity constraints. We
demonstrated that the presence of supply constraints may result in fairly complex
optimal pricing strategies as well as production/inventory policies. Thus, the pene-
tration and skimming pricing policies suggested in marketing are no longer optimal.
While the operations literature had considered capacity, it had ignored pricing.
Compared to Kumar and Swaminathan (2003), our results suggest that pricing flex-
ibility is a very effective lever to use when facing capacity constraints. Moreover,
when dynamic pricing is used, intentionally holding sales is not necessarily optimal
any longer, as pricing flexibility allows the firm to delay diffusion process without
losing any profits.
We examined the benefit of pricing flexibility and found that it is most effective
when the firm has intermediate range of capacity, and when imitation effects are
high. Finally, we showed that a penetration pricing policy, while no longer optimal,




Optimal Production and Ordering Policies with
Random Yield Production and Queueing
3.1 Introduction
In this paper, we address a problem commonly encountered in the pharmaceutical
industry. Pharmaceutical firms manufacture a batch of drugs for testing purposes
in job-shop like environments called kilo labs or pilot plants. Since most compounds
are found to be toxic or ineffective in initial trials, they are manufactured only once.
Furthermore, in this initial manufacturing process, yields tend to be fairly low and
variable. The chemicals required to make the active ingredients in the drug are often
extremely expensive (it is common for them to cost many times the cost of gold).
Since yields are random, the firm procures more chemicals and starts a larger
batch than the amount that will be needed in the trials. The major tradeoff that is
faced is as follows: If the firm starts a much larger quantity than needed, it will have
wasted a lot of expensive chemicals; on the other hand if the yield turns out to be
too low to yield a quantity sufficient for the animal and/or clinical trials, then the
trial has to be postponed until the firm can produce a second (or third etc.) batch
until the required amount is obtained. Delaying animal and clinical trials is very
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expensive1. Thus, the firm faces a problem of determining the optimal batch size for
the particular phase of clinical or animal trials.
The arrival of a batch of a new compound request to the kilo lab is a random
process as it depends on when the researchers (and the firm management) feel that
the compound is promising enough to merit a test. Thus, the kilo lab may face a
situation where it receives a large number of requests in a given month. Given this
variability in the arrival process and the resulting delays, it is clear that the batch
size should depend on the number of batches waiting to be manufactured. Taking a
risk, which results in having to produce a second batch, is much more expensive if
there are many batches (and therefore many trials) being delayed. Our experience
with the industry however is that it is common for pharmaceutical firms to use fairly
simplistic policies for determining batch sizes. Common policies inflate the amount
needed for the clinical trial by dividing the amount needed for the clinical/animal
trial by the average or minimum percentage yield the researchers observed in their
labs. Apart from the fact that the yields obtained in the researchers’ labs may not be
perfectly representative of the yields obtained in the pilot plants, the main problem
with the simplistic models is that they do not take into account the costs of delays or
materials or the number of compounds waiting to be manufactured (i.e., how loaded
the plant is). We therefore model this problem to obtain an understanding of optimal
batch sizes and their dependence on these factors.
1Some firms do not postpone clinical trials but schedule them far enough that even with very
long production lead times the trial can still start on time. Of course, this kind of delay also has
significant costs as delaying clinical trials in this manner still delays the time when the product can
be introduced to the market, potentially costing millions of dollars
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Versions of the problem that we address have been recognized in the literature
and “Multiple Lot sizing in Production to Order system with rigid demand” (MLPO).
Most of the studies assume a known probability distribution of the yield, given the
input lot size, and a setup cost for each production run. For every production run,
lot size is determined to minimize the total material and setup costs. Most of the
pharmaceutical production processes yield random outputs and have rigid demand
and are MLPO processes. The demand is often rigid because failing to provide suffi-
cient volume of drugs will delay the trials. However, the pharmaceutical production
process is characterized by some properties not studied before. First, the effect of
limited capacity combined with rigid demand, which often results in queueing, has
not been studied in the literature. In practice, capacity is often scarce since the
facilities to make these batches are expensive and even the largest pharmaceutical
companies such as Pfizer or Merck have only a few kilo labs where they can make
such batches. Clearly more capacity is needed if smaller batch sizes are used as more
production runs are needed. When there are a lot of batches waiting to be manu-
factured, smaller batch sizes can result in queueing and long delays. The existing
literature only provides solutions to the MLPO problem for a single customer, while
ignoring the externality effect of serving one customer on the other waiting orders.
In fact, the lack of kilo lab capacity in the large pharmaceutical companies has led
to the existence of contract manufacturers that manufacture batches for all pharma-
ceutical firms on demand. A common decision that the firms have to make is when
to outsource a particular batch to the contract manufacturer because the kilo lab is
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already too overloaded. We also model this decision which has not been addressed in
these problems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a literature
review. Section 3 first provides a basic model with only production decisions and as-
suming infinite raw materials, thus focusing on the tradeoff between material expense
and delay expense. We show the existence and the structure of the optimal policy and
also provide managerial insights on the factors that affect the batch size. We conduct
a numerical study to compare the optimal policy with heuristic policies commonly
used in the pharmaceutical industry. We then extend the model to the case where
the firm also has the option to outsource a batch to a contract manufacturer or run
overtime productions. Finally, we summarize our work in Section 4.
3.2 Literature Review
Our research is related to two streams of literature: queueing control models and
MLPO random yield models, and is the first one that belongs to both streams, while
having differences with previous work in both fields.
The first stream of relevant research is traditional queueing control. A typical
problem in this literature is that a machine can be operated at different rates with
different costs, and waiting orders or materials incur inventory holding costs. In some
cases a switching cost is also charged when the production rate changes. The objective
is to find an optimal policy to control the production rate, based on the length of
the queue. For detailed review of related work see Grabill, Gross and Magazine
(1977). Our model essentially controls the production rate by changing lot sizes, but
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it differs from previous work as the production rate is not completely controllable.
Even though lot size is used to control the rate, the number of production runs to
complete the service remains uncertain in our setting.
The second stream of research, random yield problems, has received considerable
amount of attention since the 1980s. An extensive review of literature on random yield
production was provided by Yano and Lee (1995). They summarize various models of
production policies with the objective of minimizing costs, which often include setup
costs, salvage costs, inventory holding costs, and backlogging or lost sale penalty costs,
etc. Some papers study rigid demand problems, while others assume that production
takes place only once or a fixed number of times for each customer. For example,
Shih (1980) generalizes the EOQ model and Henig and Gerchak (1990) generalize
the newsvendor model to include yield uncertainty, which was further generalized
to a variation of DP models for multi-period problem by Moinzadeh (1987). The
optimal production policies with random yield have a critical order point below which
it is optimal to order, but the order-up-to level is not constant. A review of the
subgroup of random yield models, the MLPO models, is provided by Grosfeld-Nir
and Gerchak (2004). In the basic model they assume that multiple production runs
have to be completed in order to fulfill the entire order of a single customer. Each
production attempt is costly for the firm, due to equipment setup costs and labor
cost, etc. While it may be natural to increase production output, reduce the number
of repeated attempts, and order a larger amount of materials. However, this may
result in unnecessary production. The key question in the related research is the
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tradeoff between batch size (and the potential of overproduction) and the number of
production runs.
One of the earliest papers on MLPO is Beja (1997), where a single stage MLPO
with binomial yield is analyzed. He proves intuitive properties of the optimal produc-
tion policy, such as the monotonicity of lot size in demand. Later research has focused
mostly on generalizing this model to more general yield distributions, including both
discrete and continuous ones. Typical discrete yield distributions are Binomial (Beja
(1997), Interrupted Geometric (Porteus (1990) and (1986)), Uniform (Anily (1993)),
and All-or-Nothing (Grosfeld-Nir and Gerchak (2004)). For continuous yield distri-
bution, on the other hand, the optimal lot size cannot be computed recursively and
thus has received less attention. To the best of our knowledge, the only MLPO model
with continuous distribution is by Grosfeld-Nir and Gerchak (1990). They assume
a power distribution and provide closed-form solutions for special cases with power
parameters k = 1 and 2. Our model assumes a more general yield distribution.
Our model also generalizes the previous models to include continuous yield distri-
butions and, at the same time, incorporate queueing effects. These effects have not
been studied before in the MLPO literature, and the optimal solution to the tradeoff
between the material cost and delay cost remains unclear in systems with random
yield, rigid demand, and order queueing.
Almost all of the MLPO papers focus on material cost savings, but ignore the
effect of multiple production runs on customer delays. Most papers assume single-
demand problems, in which only one customer requires to be served. Orders’ waiting
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time, however, is often an important performance measure and is associated with
costs in a make-to-order environment. Reduction in the number of production runs
not only shortens the waiting time for the customer being served, but creates an
external effect of reducing all other orders’ waiting time.
There exist some random yield models with multiple orders, but with the re-
strictive assumption of only limited number of production runs. Most models include
assumptions of one production run per period, linear holding and shortage costs, com-
plete backlogging and, with one exception, zero lead times (Yano and Lee (1995)).
None of them studies rigid demand in make-to-order system.
We next present our basic model that looks at the tradeoff between material costs
and order delay costs.
3.3 Basic Model
We study a make-to-order production system with a single server. Orders arrive
according to a Poisson process with rate λ, each of whom demands D̄. Products are
unique to orders, therefore the product is made to order. Orders are served FCFS,
and only one customer can be served at one time. We assume that orders wait until
getting the entire demand. Any excessive production has to be discarded and cannot
be used in the future.
The production process yields random output. While most of the continuous
yield literature is restricted to stochastically proportional yield, meaning the portion
of production output to input follows a common distribution, we allow a more gen-
eral distribution. We also allow yield distribution to be non-stationary. The yield
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distribution is often improved from one trial to another. This is because the firm’s
chemists learn about the root cause of yield loss, and use this information in con-
secutive runs. Given lot size Q and the production run number i of a particular
order, we define Y to be the amount of product obtained, with cdf F (i, Q, y) and pdf
f(i, Q, y) =
∂F (i, Q, y)
∂y
. Grosfeld-Nir and Gerchak (1990) assume the yield propor-
tion has a support [0, 1], while we assume the support of F is [a, b], 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1.
Although this does not change the analytical results, we feel it is more realistic
for pharmaceutical production processes where the yield rate has a minimum lower
bound. If the products obtained from one production run is not sufficient, another
production run is restarted, and the process continues until sufficient products are
obtained. We assume F and f are twice continuous differentiable.
The time for each production run is a random variable T , and is assumed i.i.d with
cdf G(.), pdf g(.) and mean
1
µ
. This is consistent with the pharmaceutical production
processes, where the production time is often determined by the chemical reaction
time in the reactor. G, g and µ are the independent of lot size Q. We assume λ < µ
for system stability.
The costs we consider include linear material cost cM per unit material used, linear
customer waiting cost cW per unit time per order, and resource cost cR per unit time
for the resources (e.g., machine, labor, etc.) used to make the products. Setup cost
for each production run is ignored, but it can be easily included without changing
the results significantly.
A batch size Q needs to be determined before starting each production run. If Q
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is too large, one or two production runs may be able to provide sufficient products,
and this accelerates service speed at the cost of large material waste. On the other
hand, if Q is too small, the desired amount can be obtained with less material waste,
but this may cause a long queue of waiting orders. So the objective is to find the
optimal production lot size Q∗ that minimizes the expected long-run average cost.
Intuitively, lot size decisions are influenced by demand and how heavily the system
is loaded. So we define the state variables as:
(i,D, N) = (production run number of the first order, remaining demand of the
first order, number of orders in the system). (i,D, N) ∈ N × [0, D̄]× Z+.
We further restrict the decision space. Since any Q ≥ D
a
will produce enough
quantity to meet demand, without loss of generality we can restrict attention to
Q ≤ D
a
. Furthermore, we assume Q ≥ D
b
so that there is positive probability to
obtain more than demand with one production run. When b = 1 this is consistent with
the assumption Q ≥ D in Grosfeld-Nir and Gerchak (1990). One can create possible
instances where Q > D may not be optimal when the delay costs are trivially small,
but in practice the delay costs are significant enough that one would never produce
a quantity less than demand. In fact we believe that this assumption is even more
reasonable in our setting compared to settings where delay costs were not considered.















We determine lot sizes for each production run in order to minimize total material
and waiting costs. Let Γ(T ) be the number of production runs started until time T ,

















cW Nt + cR1N(t)dt


The problem can be formulated as a Markov Decision Process. Decisions are made
after each production run or when a customer arrives in an empty system. If there
are N orders in the system, the first order requires D more units to complete the
order, and it is the ith production run for the first order, then after one production
run, if the yield Y is greater than D, the new state is (1, D̄, N + N ′ − 1), where N ′
is the number of orders that arrived during the production process. If the yield Y is
smaller than D, then the new state is (i + 1, D− Y, N + N ′). The distribution of N ′






For each production run, the associated costs are material cost, waiting cost of
the orders in the queue, and waiting cost of the orders who just arrived during this
production run. Material cost is straightforward and defined to be cMQ; the expected
waiting cost of orders in the queue during the production run is W = cW /µ per
order; and the expected waiting cost of the new arrivals Wnew can be computed
in the following way: Given production time T , the expected number of arrivals is
λ ∗ T . Since the arrivals follow a Poisson process, these arrivals are i.i.d uniformly
distributed on [0, T ], thus the expected waiting time for each order is T/2. Therefore
the expected total waiting time of new arrivals is Wnew = cW λ ∗E(T 2/2). Note that
both W and Wnew are independent of i,D,N and Q.
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We can write the optimality equations as the following:
V (i,D, 0) + g ∗ 1/λ = V (1, D̄, 1); (3.1)
V (i,D, N) + g ∗ 1/µ = min
Q∈Ω(D)









V (i + 1, D − y,N + N ′)dF (i, Q, y)
]
}, (3.4)
for all i ∈ N, D ∈ (0, D̄], N ≥ 1.
We also define V (i, 0, N) = limD→0+ V (i,D, N).
The three terms in (3.2) include the waiting costs for orders already in queue,
the waiting costs of new arrivals, and the material costs. (3.3) is the cost-to-go when
yield is large enough to satisfy the current order after this production run. Finally,
(3.4) is the cost-to-go when yield from this production run is not enough to satisfy
the current order.
We show that a unique optimal production policy exists and also provide the
structure. We define a cost difference function H(i,D,N) = V (i,D, N)−V (1, D̄, N−
1) for all i ∈ N, D ∈ [0, D̄], N ≥ 1. For N ≥ 1, we can rearrange the terms and use
only H(i,D,N) functions with N ≥ 1 in the optimality equations.
V (i,D, N)− V (1, D̄, N − 1) + g/µ = min
Q∈Ω(D)
































Prob(N ′)V (1, D̄, N − 1)} (3.6)
= min
Q∈Ω(D)













(V (i + 1, D − y, N + N ′)
−V (1, D̄, N + N ′ − 1)
)
dF (i, Q, y)}
= min
Q∈Ω(D)




Prob(N ′)((V (1, D̄, N + N ′ − 1)− V (1, D̄, N + N ′ − 2)
+(V (1, D̄, N + N ′ − 2)− V (1, D̄, N + N ′ − 3))







(V (i + 1, D − y,N + N ′)
−V (1, D̄, N + N ′ − 1))dF (i, Q, y)}. (3.7)
Replace V (i,D, N)− V (1, D̄, N − 1) by H(i,D, N) , then















H(i + 1, D − y,N + N ′)dF (i, Q, y)}. (3.8)
(3.9)
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Notice that the first three terms in (3.8) do not depend on Q while the last two terms
do depend on Q.
3.3.1 Optimal Lot Size Decisions
Intuitively, we expect a larger lot size if more people are waiting or if the quantity
needed to satisfy the first order increases. Theorem 4 provides conditions under which
a unique optimal policy exists and increases in both demand and queue length.
Theorem 4 There exists a unique optimal policy Q∗(i,D,N) increasing with D and
N for each i, if for each i (a) F (i, Q, y) is decreasing and convex in Q, and (b)
F (i, Q, y) is submodular in (Q, y).
Proof: All proofs are presented in appendices.
It is easy to find yield distributions that satisfy conditions in Theorem 4. For ex-
ample, consider stochastically proportional yield distributions, where the yield rate is
independent of lot size, i.e., Y/Q follows the same distribution for any Q. In mathe-
matical terms, if there exists some probability distribution P (x), such that F (i, Q, y)





for any i, Q, then F is a stochastically proportional yield
distribution.
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condition (a) and (b) in Theorem 4 become:















































































Therefore for a stochastically proportional yield distribution, if P ′i (x)+xP
′′
i (x) ≥ 0
for any x ∈ [a, b] and i, i.e., if xP ′i (x) is increasing in x, then condition (a) and (b) in
Theorem 4 are satisfied.
The condition that xP ′i (x) is increasing is satisfied by any stochastically pro-
portional yield distributions with increasing densities, such as power distributions





, x ∈ [a, 1], r ≥ 1, and exponential pdf P (x) = e
x − 1
e− 1 , x ∈ [0, 1]. xP
′
i (x)
is also increasing for some stochastically proportional yield distributions with non-
monotone densities, such as the incomplete triangular distribution


















as well as some with decreasing densities, such as





x, x ∈ [0, 1].
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If yield rate Y/Q is dependent on Q, we can also find distributions that satisfy
condition (a) and (b) in Theorem 4. An example is











, for Q > 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ Q.
We are interested in the relative inflation rate, which is the ratio of optimal lot size
over demand, Q∗/D. If yield follows stochastically proportional power distribution,
we show that although the optimal lot size increases in demand, the inflation rate
decreases in D. With smaller demand, a relatively large lot can be used to accelerate
service, since the cost of wasting material is small. When demand grows larger, it
may be better to try several production runs with lot sizes close to demand, to reduce
the risk of poor yield. The result is summarized in Theorem 5.
Theorem 5 If the yield distribution is a stochastically proportional power distribu-
tion, i.e., if for any i, Q, F (i, Q, y) = (
y
Q
)ri , for some ri ≥ 1, then the optimal
inflation rate Q∗(i,D, N)/D decreases in D.
We also show that the optimal lot size monotonically increases in the unit waiting
cost, the arrival rate, and the production time.
Theorem 6 When a = 0, the optimal production quantity Q∗ increases 1) if material
cost cM decreases, 2) if waiting cost cw increases, 3) if λ increases, 4) if the production
time T stochastically increases, or 5) if yield Y stochastically decreases and F ′Q(i, Q, y)
also decreases.
Theorem 6 shows that the behavior of the optimal lot sizes is intuitive. Higher



















p Min-rate policy (b)
Avg-rate policy (c)
Figure 3.1. Cost difference of heuristic policies

















p Min-rate policy (b)
Avg-rate policy (c)
Figure 3.2. Cost difference of heuristic policies
and optimal policy with different service rates.
cause the firm does not want to waste valuable material. Higher delay costs have the
opposite effect. More demand or slower production completion also result in larger
batch sizes.
We have proved the policy structures for the optimal dynamic lot sizing decisions.
In reality, firms often use some simple strategies to control lot sizes. A common
strategy is to use the same inflation rate for any demand or queue length. We conduct
a numerical study to compare the profits under these strategies with the optimal
policy. We consider the following three policies: (a) The optimal policy, (b) fixed
inflation by minimum yield, i.e., Q = D/a, and (c) fixed inflation by average yield,
i.e., Q = D/EX.
For all the figures, we use λ = 1, a = 1, cW = 150, cR = 0, D̄ = 50. We use
µ = 4, r = 1, cM = 4 if these parameters are not changed in the graph. We set
a maximum queue length as 20, and use a step size 0.1. The program converges if
maxD,N V
k+1((D, N)−V k(D,N))−minD,N(V k+1((D,N)−V k(D,N)) is smaller than
0.1.
We compare the costs resulting from these three policies. Figure 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3
show the cost difference of policy (b) and (c) as a percentage of the optimal average
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Figure 3.3. Cost difference of heuristic policies and optimal policy with different yield distributions.
Figure 3.1 shows the relative costs of the heuristic policies as the material cost
changes. Clearly, policy (b) performs better with smaller material cost. This is
intuitive since if material is cheap, a larger lot size can be used and thus Q = D/a
is closer to optimal. policy (c) performs in the opposite way. When material is more
expensive, policy (c) performs better. The other two graphs show a similar pattern
when the production rate changes or when yield distribution changes.
In summary, policy (b) is the most conservative policy, and it works the best
when material is cheap, when production is slow, or when yield is poor. Policy (c) is
an intermediate solution and it works better when material is more expensive, when
production is slower, or when yield is better. Both policies can perform significantly
badly compared to the optimal policy, with 25 − 50% higher costs easily observable
in many cases. This indicates that taking the externality of delays caused by the lot
sizing decisions into account has a large impact on costs.
3.3.2 Overtime or Subcontracting Decisions
In our setting, the firm has to rerun the production when any demand remains to be
satisfied. In reality, firms sometimes have an option to schedule excess capacity (in
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the form of overtime or subcontracting for capacity) to finish the current order with-
out delaying other orders. Overtime production often incurs higher resource costs,
therefore the firm needs to make a decision as to when to run overtime production.
Similarly, the use of subcontracting plants to outsource some of the active ingredient
production is fairly common in the pharmaceutical industry, but the subcontracting
plants may charge a higher price than using internal production. If the firm has the
option to subcontract, it also needs to make the optimal subcontracting decisions
depending on the remaining demand and system utilization.
As these two decisions share some common elements, we consider the two decisions
in the same section. In the overtime situation, we assume that after a production
run for a particular order with lot size Q, if the output is not sufficient to satisfy the
order, the firm may either decide to rerun the same product, or to start producing
the next order and schedule overtime for the current order without delaying other
orders. (This is fairly common in the companies we have worked with). We make
an assumption that the firm has infinite overtime capacity. The material cost for
overtime production is the same, while the resource cost is higher, cO > cR per unit
of time. During the overtime production, the firm also needs to make optimal lot
sizing decisions. Therefore, the subproblem during overtime production is equivalent
60
to Grosfeld-Nir and Gerchak (1990).
V (i,D, N) + g/µ = min
Q∈Ω(D)
{









min [V (i + 1, D − y,N + N ′),
CO(i + 1, D − y) + V (1, D̄, N + N ′ − 1)
]





W + cO/µ + cMQ +
∫ D
aQ
CO(i + 1, D − y)dF (i, Q, y)
}
In the equations above, during the regular production, if the order is not satisfied
after a production run, the firm can choose to continue production for this order, or to
work on the next order and do overtime production for the current order. CO(i,D) is
the total production cost if overtime production is used for the ith trial of a particular
order and if the unsatisfied demand for that order is D. The overtime production
cost is similar to the regular production cost except that delay costs for other orders
are not incurred.
In the case of subcontracting, we assume that when the firm is producing for a
particular order, the firm may decide a lot size Q and start producing for this order,
or the firm may decide to switch to the next order, and subcontract this order to
a subcontractor. The subcontractor charges a price CS(D) which is assumed to be
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increasing in D. The optimality equations for N ≥ 1 then become:
V (i,D, N) + g/µ = min
Q∈Ω(D)
{









min [V (i + 1, D − y,N + N ′),
CS(D − y) + V (1, D̄, N + N ′ − 1)
]
dF (i, Q, y)
]}
For both situations, we can apply similar techniques and define H(i,D, N) =
V (i,D, N)− V (1, D̄, N − 1). Then
H(i,D,N) + g/µ = min
Q∈Ω(D)
{








H(1, D̄, n) +
∫ D
aQ
min[H(i + 1, D − y, N + N ′),
C(D − y)]dF (i, Q, y)]}
where C(D − y) = CO(i + 1, D − y) in the situation of overtime production, and
C(D − y) = CS(D − y) in the situation of subcontracting.
For both situations, we can show that there exists a threshold in queue length for
each remaining demand level, such that the firm starts to work on the next order if
and only if the current queue length exceeds that threshold. The idea is intuitive:
if the number of waiting orders exceeds a limit, which means the system is heavily
utilized and cost of delay is significant, the firm should consider overtime production
or subcontracting for the current order.
Theorem 7 If the conditions in Theorem 4 are satisfied, then there exists a unique
optimal lot size Q∗(D,N) increasing in D and N . After the production run if D̃ unit
of demand still needs to be satisfied for the current order, and if there are Ñ orders
62
in total, then there exists an N̄(D̃), such that the firm runs overtime production (or
subcontracts production) if and only if the queue length Ñ ≥ N̄(D̃); otherwise the
firm starts a new regular production run for the current order.
Next we consider the threshold structure for the remaining demand. In the sit-
uation of subcontracting, if the subcontracting cost consists of a fixed cost AS and
a linear variable cost cS, and the yield follows stochastically proportional power dis-
tribution, we can show that the optimal policy has a threshold structure for the
remaining demand level depending on the fixed cost. If the fixed cost is relatively
small, then there is one threshold for the remaining demand below which the firm
would subcontract the production. If the remaining demand of the customer currently
in service is below the threshold, then it is not worthwhile to restart the production
run and make other orders wait, thus it is optimal to subcontract. Moreover, the
threshold level (the remaining quantity below which the firm subcontracts produc-
tion) is increasing in the queue length. However, if the fixed cost is relatively high,
then there two thresholds for the remaining demand level. If the remaining demand
is too low, the savings on subcontracting cannot offset the high fixed cost, thus it is
optimal to continue the production in house. If the remaining demand is at an inter-
mediate level, it is worthwhile to pay the fixed cost and subcontract the production,
in order to accelerate the production and save the delay cost on other orders. The
results are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 8 If the subcontracting cost is linear in the remaining demand, i.e., CS(D) =
AS +cSD, where AS is a constant, and if the yield is stochastically proportional power
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distribution, then for each N , there exists a constant Ā, such that
1. If the fixed cost AS ≤ Ā, then there exists a threshold D̄i(N), such that the firm
subcontracts production if and only if the remaining demand for the current order
D ≤ D̄∗i (N), otherwise the firm starts a new regular production run for the current
order. Furthermore, the threshold D∗i (N) is increasing in N .
2. If the fixed cost AS > Ā, then there exist two thresholds Di(N) ≤ D̄i(N), such that
the firm subcontracts production if and only if the remaining demand for the current
order Di(N) ≤ D ≤ D̄i(N). Furthermore, the threshold Di(N) decreases in N and
D̄i(N) increases in N .
In the situation of overtime production, the firm still makes optimal lot sizing
decisions during the overtime productions. Depending on the overtime cost, we can
show that the overtime decisions also have a threshold structure.
Theorem 9 Assume that the conditions in Theorem 4 are satisfied. For each queue
length N , there exist two thresholds ci(N) ≤ c̄i(N), such that
1. If the overtime resource cost cO ≤ ci(N), then the firm runs overtime production for
the current order for any remaining demand on the current lot.
2. If the overtime resource cost cO > c̄i(N), then the firm continues production for the
current order for any remaining demand on the current lot.
3. If the overtime resource cost ci(N) < cO ≤ c̄i(N), then there exists a threshold D̄
such that the firm runs overtime production if and only if the remaining demand on
the current lot D < D̄.
The theorem above describes the firm’s optimal overtime production policy. If the
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overtime resource cost is too high or too low, continue production or overtime produc-
tion dominates for any demand. If the overtime resource cost is in the intermediate
range, then the firm only does overtime production if the remaining demand is small
enough.
3.4 Summary
In this paper we study a lot-sizing problem in pharmaceutical industry with consider-
able yield losses, high material costs, high delay costs and limited capacity. We build
a dynamic programming model to show how the optimal lot sizes should be adjusted
based on the actual demand and queue length.
Our model builds a bridge between the classic queueing control models and MLPO
random yield models, and provides solutions under joint consideration. We also adopt
a more general yield distribution than the existing random yield literature. Our
optimality results indicate that the simple inflation rate policies currently used in
many pharmaceutical companies are very far from optimal. In certain situations the
cost can be significantly decreased if the lot sizes can be dynamically adjusted as in
the optimal policy.
Clearly, our model captures the two critical elements that should be taken into
account for lot-sizing decisions: material cost and delay cost. Other factors may
be interesting for further exploration. Future directions may include analysis of a
process with multiple production stages, heterogeneous demand with priority service,
learning effects that improve yield rate over time.
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CHAPTER 4
Make-or-Buy Decisions When Cost Reduction
Requires Minimum Production Quantity
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, increasingly many US companies seek lower production costs and
outsource all or a portion of their production to developing countries, such as Mexico
and Southeast Asia, mostly due to lower labor and material costs in these regions.
Thus, in a variety of industries where low cost plays an important role in gaining com-
petitive advantage, the potential for outsourcing has made the Make-or-Buy decision
extremely visible and strategically important.
When making outsourcing decisions, firms might, and often do, limit themselves
to the comparison of the current outsourcing and internal production costs, or in
case of more sophisticated firms, they may take into consideration likely trends in
the currency exchange rates and in labor rates per hour. In reality, however, costs
do not remain the same over time even if these global conditions are fairly stable.
Clearly, cost reductions are widely observed in various industries and sectors, such as
high-tech or sectors with new products and technologies. Myopic comparisons often
ignore the fact that various firms have different potentials to reduce costs, and that
manufacturers have no direct control over Supplier’s production cost or cost-reducing
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activities. In this paper, we model two elements related to cost reduction activities,
the first one being a minimum production quantity necessary for a firm to engage in
an active learning, and the second one being the costly effort necessary in order to
learn and reduce cost. In practice, these two elements are essential for allowing cost
reductions and, sometimes, they are referred to as “learning-by-doing”.
To model such a “learning-by-doing” environment, we consider a Manufacturer
selling a single product with fixed demand and fixed retail price in a two-period
model. Manufacturer can produce the product himself as well as outsource any
portion of production to a Supplier. Each of them can invest effort in cost-reducing
activities, but cost reduction can take effect only if production quantity exceeds a
certain minimum level. Based on wholesale price offered by supplier, manufacturer
decides whether to produce or to outsource. Clearly, the strategies of the supplier
and manufacturer as well as the optimal production and outsourcing quantities are
influenced by both starting production costs and learning abilities.
Outsourcing in practice means giving up some of the decision rights. Thus, a nat-
ural question is about the relative benefits of centralized versus decentralized solution,
In the considered “learning-by-doing” environment, owning a facility (a centralized
system) means that manufacturer can capture all benefits from cost reductions, as
opposed to two independent firms acting in their own interest. We compare the
decisions in these two ownership environments.
Our work is closely related to Gray et al (2007), who also study cost reduction
through learning-by-doing, in a two-period model. Our model differs from theirs in a
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few aspects, such as modeling research questions, and the resulting insights. First, our
model focuses on an settings with low price sensitivity and includes realistic features
of “’earning by doing” environment. Price and demand are fixed in our model as
opposed to price being a linear function of demand. We require that production has
to exceed a certain minimum quantity and that costly effort needs to be invested,
which are not considered in Greys et al. Instead of function of production, the learning
in our model is a function of effort (usually learning and cost reductions do not take
place automatically in practice). We also incorporate a realistic feature of uncertainty
in the cost-reducing effect. Some of the observations in Gray et al (2007) and in our
model are the same. For example, Manufacturer may choose to produce internally,
even if he is at a cost disadvantage, partial outsourcing is possible, and Supplier may
charge below-cost wholesale prices. It is easy, however, to see that without price
sensitivity, the many of the results described Greys et al would not anymore hold.
In terms of research questions, Gray et al (2007) focuses on the influence of power
structure between Manufacture and Supplier, while we concentrate on identifying
when and why outsourcing in general, and partial outsourcing specifically, is more
likely. In settings where Supplier is Stackelberg leader, we show that the results de-
pend on the cost difference of Manufacturer and Supplier and also on the learning
ability and minimum production quantity. Also, partial outsourcing is more likely
when the initial cost difference is relatively small, when Manufacturer’s learning is
more uncertain, and when the minimum production quantity required for Manufac-
turer to be able to learn is larger.
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Finally, some of our additional insights follow from a three-period model which
shows that Manufacturer can benefit from Supplier’s learning behavior and, conse-
quently, Manufacturer may consider investing some effort to subsidize the Supplier’s
cost of effort. However, sometimes this benefit disappears. If Supplier knows that
Manufacturer would be willing to help, Supplier will take advantage of it and charge
a higher wholesale price, forcing Manufacturer to inded subsidize his cost. In this
situation Manufacturer may end up worse off compared to not having this option.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the previous work on sub-
contracting problems; Section 3 describes the basic model and analyze the problem;
Section 4 extends the model to three periods and considers the option of effort sharing.
Section 5 summarizes the work.
4.2 Literature Review
The early research of outsourcing decisions considers only one decision maker and
outsourcing is used as a more expensive outside production option to be used when
internal production is not sufficient. Lee and Zipkin (1989) study the multi-period
inventory problem assuming reliable outsourcing capacity and a constant cost. They
characterize the structure of inventory policy and provide a DP algorithm to compute
the optimal solution. Atamturk and Hochbaum (2001) consider a problem of acquir-
ing a fixed capacity to meet non-stationary deterministic demand over a multi-period
horizon. Production and outsourcing decisions are made after capacity is acquired.
They construct a Linear Programming model and provide an algorithm to find the
optimal decisions.
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Later work takes supplier’s reaction into account and focuses on the contract
design and supply chain coordination between manufacturer and supplier. Kamien
and Li (1990) study a multi-period production planning problem and define feasible,
transaction-feasible, efficient, and dominant contracts. They show that coordination
contracts, which achieve social optimum, are always feasible and always dominate
other contracts. An example with quadratic production cost is used to demonstrate
that subcontracting is a useful tool for production smoothing. Van Mieghem (1999)
adds capacity investment cost to cost factors and studies four types of outsourcing
contracts. He shows that an incomplete contract, where production quantities are
jointly decided in order to maximize total profit, can coordinate production decisions,
but only state-dependent contract, where price or quantity is agreed up-front as a
function of capacities and demands, can coordinate both capacity and production
decisions.
In both of the above papers on contract design, costs and demands are exogenously
given. Plambeck and Taylor (2001) propose a model in which firms can use effort
to stimulate demands and also the firms can outsource their production to a joint
supplier. They show that when benefits of capacity pooling are significant and profits
are retained (or mostly retained), manufacturers may be better off by subcontracting
their production. Lewis and Sappington (1991) propose a model close to ours, where
costs can be reduced by technological improvements. Both technology and costly
effort can reduce production cost, while technology can also increase the efficiency
of effort and reduce the cost of the effort. They show that technology improvement
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leads to a more frequent use of internal production. However, both manufacturer
and society may be worse with more frequent technology changes. Their model is
a one-period game focusing primarily on the effect of asymmetric information. In
our paper, we have assumed that demand is exogenous and that production cost can
be reduced over time due to learning by doing. We are interested in understanding
how outsourcing decisions are made and how production and learning decisions are
related to the outsourcing option.
Another related question is often labeled as “make or buy” decision and a subset
of papers in operations and economics literature asks when it is in firms’ interest to
both make and buy. Kamien, Li, and Samet (1989) study the effect of adding subcon-
tracting option to Bertrand game. Because of strictly convex production costs, sub-
contracting is beneficial, as it allows for reallocating production and thus a decrease in
the marginal cost. Spiegel (1993) studies subcontracting within Cournot framework.
Costs include a convex upstream cost (manufacturing) and a linear downstream cost
(marketing and sale). Two types of subcontracting agreements are allowed: ex ante
agreements signed before the firms compete in the market, and ex post agreements
signed after competition takes place. He shows that subcontracting can allocate pro-
duction more efficiently under asymmetric costs. In both papers, concurrent sourcing
is due to the diseconomy of scale resulting from convex production costs. None of the
models above considers the interaction between production process and cost reduc-
tion. In our model firms can reduce costs with effort, but only if a certain production
requirement is satisfied. We show that in absence of the diseconomy of scale dual
71
production can still appear.
We described the work by Greys et al in the previous section. Our results are
complementary in the sense that they apply in price insensitive environment, and
include the realistic features of cost of effort, minima over which learning may take
place, and uncertainty in the effects of effort. We also explain how the multi-period
behavior may differ from a stylized two-period setting. At the end of the paper, we
also consider the possibility for Manufacturer to share learning effort of Supplier. A
related work is Krishnan et al (2004), which considers the impact of effort sharing
between a manufacturer and a retailer, and compares different contract mechanisms.
Other research related to our work appears in corporate strategy framework.
Parmigiani (2002) claims that firms may choose concurrent sourcing if (a) no clear
price advantage exists for either internal or external suppliers; (b) quality monitoring
is difficult; (c) disputes are not likely; (d) both autonomous and coordinative incen-
tives exist. Our results confirm not only that (a) is a possible condition for dual
sourcing, but provide a model that explains potential reasons for this outcome.
4.3 Model
We consider a Manufacturer selling a single product in two periods (i = 1, 2). In
each period, prices are exogenously given as P1 and P2, and demand in Period i is a
random variable Qi with expectation Q̄i. Demand has to be satisfied in full.
Manufacturer is considering to outsource some production to a Supplier. Both
Manufacturer and Supplier’s production costs are linear. Without other consider-
ations, Manufacturer would outsource all production if Supplier quotes a wholesale
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price lower than Manufacturer’s cost. However, both firms have the ability of learning
and consequently reducing their production costs if they have the chance to conduct
sufficient amount of production. These cost-reducing activities also require some
costly effort, and the cost reduction takes place at the beginning of the next period.
Specifically, if firm I’s unit production cost in Period 1 is cI1, then if firm I produces
qI1 less than a certain minimum quantity q
I
min, his cost stays the same in the next
period. If he produces more than qImin, then he can invest effort ε
I , and his cost











cI1 − gI(εI , δI) else.
Let ḡI(ε) be the expectation of gI(ε, δ).
In each period i = 1, 2, events happen in the following sequence:
1. Supplier quotes linear wholesale price ωi.
2. Demand realizes, Manufacturer decides in-house production quantity qMi and





3. Both Manufacturer and Supplier determine effort level εMi and ε
S
i .
4. Production takes place, and costs are reduced at the beginning of the next
period if production quantities exceed minimum amount.
We make the following assumptions:
1. Pi ≥ cM1 and Pi ≥ cS1 , i = 1, 2. We assume that production makes nonnegative
profit at both firms in every period.
2. The two random disturbance δM and δS are independent.
73
3. ḡM(ε) is concave in ε, so as Manufacturer invests more effort, the learning effect
diminishes.
4. Without loss of generality, we assume the unit monetary cost of effort is 1.
5. In each period, the realized demand is large enough for two firms to possibly
learn, i.e., Qi ≥ qMmin + qSmin for any realized Qi, i = 1, 2.
6. If Manufacturer is indifferent between producing q1 and q2 in house, he always
chooses to produce the smaller quantity.
The last assumption restricts the game outcome on one path. It is reasonable
since Supplier is the Stackleburg leader, he can always reduce wholesale price by a
tiny amount, then Manufacturer will choose to produce the smaller quantity.
Both firms maximize expected total profit for two periods,
πM = EQ1,Q2,δM ,δS
2∑
i=1
(Pi − cMi )qMi + (Pi − ωi)qSi − εM1
πS = EQ1,Q2,δM ,δS
2∑
i=1
(Pi − cSi )qSi − εS1
4.3.1 Centralized Problem
As a benchmark we first consider the case where a single firm owns both facilities M
and S, and considers the problem of allocating demand in each period in order to
maximize expected total profit. Then similarly we have the two-threshold properties
of quantity allocation:
Lemma 11 There exist two thresholds x1 ≤ 0 ≤ x2 such that the production quantity
at M is:
qM1 = Q1 if c
M
1 − cS1 ≤ x1, qM1 = Q1 − qSmin if x1 ≤ cM1 − cS1 ≤ 0, qM1 = qMmin if
0 ≤ cM1 − cS1 ≤ x2, and qM1 = 0 if x2 ≤ cM1 − cS1 .
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If both learning functions are deterministic, then one of the two thresholds x1
and x2 must be zero, since we know exactly which facility can have lower cost in the
second period and thus will not invest effort in the other facility.
4.3.2 Decentralized Game
Next we analyze the game equilibrium when Manufacturer and Supplier do not belong
to the same company. We analyze this game in a backward fashion. First we examine
the pricing and production strategies in the second period, given costs cM2 and c
S
2 .
Since no learning effects need to be considered in the second period, the results are
straightforward and are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 12 If the costs at the beginning of the second period are cM2 and c
S
2 , then
(a) If cM2 ≥ cS2 , then Supplier offers wholesale price ω2 = cM2 and produces all qS2 = Q2.
(b) If cM2 < c
S
2 , then Manufacturer produces all q
M
2 = Q2.
(c) Manufacturer makes expected profit RM2 = (P2− cM2 )Q̄2, and Supplier makes expected
profit RS2 = (c
M
2 − cS2 )+Q̄2, where x+ represents the positive part of x.
We observe that Manufacturer makes the same profit no matter where the pro-
duction takes place, and also no matter how cheaply Supplier can produce. This
indicates that in the first period Manufacturer does not have an incentive to let Sup-
plier improve his cost, on the other hand, he has a strong incentive to reduce his own
cost.
Supplier only makes positive profit if his cost is lower than Manufacturer’s. Fur-
thermore, the difference between Manufacturer’s cost and his own cost represents the
profit margin he is able to obtain. This implies that in the first period Supplier also
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has an incentive to reduce his own cost, but at the same time he would try to prevent
Manufacturer from improving.
We examine the effort investment after production and outsourcing decisions are
made in the first period. Apparently no effort is invested if the production quan-
tity is smaller than the minimum requirement. If it exceeds the minimum quantity,
then Manufacturer invests a certain level of effort εM
e
regardless of initial costs and
Supplier’s improvement, while Supplier’s effort level is a function of initial costs cM1
and cS1 , and also depends on whether Manufacturer improves or not. The results are
summarized in the following lemma.





(a) Manufacturer invests a unique effort εM
e
if qM1 ≥ qMmin, where εM e = arg max(−ε +
ḡM(ε)Q̄2);
(b) Supplier invests effort εS
e







arg max{−εS + EδS(cM1 − cS1 + gS(εS, δS))+Q̄2} if qM1 < qMmin,
arg max{−εS + EδM ,δS(cM1 − cS1 + gS(εS, δS)− gM(εM e, δM))+Q̄2} else.
As an intermediate result, we find that no matter whether outsourcing or produc-
ing internally, Manufacturer always invests in the same level of effort. On the other
hand, Supplier will not invest in any learning effort if he expects that he is not going
to obtain any production in the second period. If Supplier will produce in the second
period, he will invest in some learning effort in the first period, the amount of which
depends on the quantity he will produce. The larger the outsourcing quantity in the
second period, the more effort Supplier invests in.
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Since Manufacturer does not benefit from Supplier’s learning, we find that Man-
ufacturer does not have an incentive to help Supplier learn. As we will notice later,
this conclusion is only suitable for short planning horizon (two periods in this case).
When the problem is extended into three periods, Manufacturer may be willing to
help Supplier learn from production.
We redefine some notations to simplify analysis below. Let GM(Q̄2) = −ε +
ḡM(ε)Q̄2, then G
M is the extra profit Manufacturer gains from learning. Manufacturer


























represent Supplier’s maximum second-period profit subtracted
by effort cost when (a) only Supplier can learn, (b) both firms can learn, and (c) only
Manufacturer can learn, respectively.










qMmin if ω̄ < ω1 ≤ cM1 ,
Q1 else.
Notice that other than full internal production (qM1 = Q1) and full outsourcing




min) takes place. The
lemma indicates that Manufacturer allocates production quantity according to the
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wholesale price Supplier offers. Using his own current production cost as a bench-
mark, if the wholesale price is higher than his cost, Manufacturer produces all the
demand internally. If the wholesale price is much lower than his own cost, Manu-
facturer outsources all the production. However, if the wholesale price is lower than
Manufacturer’s cost, but not significantly lower, Manufacturer chooses to outsource
most of the production, but still keep a minimum level of internal production, in order
to learn and reduce cost in the next period. This may happen no matter outsourcing
takes place or not in the next period, because Manufacturer’s profit only depends on
his own cost, so he always has an incentive to learn and reduce cost.
Knowing Manufacturer’s response to any wholesale price, Supplier chooses one
to maximize his own expected profit. We observe that ω̄ is independent of demand
in the first period Q1, therefore Manufacturer’s quantity allocation is independent of
demand realization. Since any wholesale price ω1 ∈ [0, ω̄] results in the same quantity
allocation and effort investment, and similarly for any ω1 ∈ (ω̄, cM1 ], Supplier quotes
the highest wholesale price by which he can obtain a certain amount of production.
So Supplier considers three options and chooses the one with the highest expected
profit: (a) Offer deep discount ω1 = ω̄ and produce all demand q
S
1 = Q1 for any
realized demand Q1; (b) Match Manufacturer’s cost ω1 = c
M
1 and produce partial
demand qS1 = Q1 − qMmin; and (c) Offer ω1 > cM1 and produce nothing qS1 = 0.
When considering these three options, Supplier makes tradeoff between price and
quantity, and also between current period profit and future gains. Myopically, a larger
quantity can only be obtained through a deep discount; For future considerations,
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Supplier benefits from large quantity in two ways: having enough production provides
Supplier the opportunity of learning, and having extremely large production prevents
Manufacturer from learning. The following table lists the pros and cons for each
option.
(a)qS1 = Q1 (b) q
S
1 = Q1 − qMmin (c) qS1 = 0
Wholesale price in Period 1 Small Medium Large
Quantity in Period 1 Large Medium Zero
Wholesale price in Period 2 Large Small Small
Cost reduction in Period 2 Large Large Small
We show in the following theorem that the choice of Supplier is monotone in
initial cost difference. So if Supplier’s initial cost cS1 is significantly lower than Man-
ufacturer’s, he will produce all, if Supplier’s initial cost is significantly higher than
Manufacturer’s, he will produce nothing and if their costs are close, he will produce
partial demand.




qM1 = Q1, ω1 > c
M
1 , if c
M
1 − cS1 < x1
qM1 = q
M
min, ω1 = c
M
1 , if x1 ≤ cM1 − cS1 < x2
qM1 = 0, ω1 = ω̄, else








(−εS+EδM ,δS(gS(εS, δS)−gM(εM e, δM))+Q̄2)
x1 < 0 indicates that as long as Supplier has a lower cost, he will outsource at
least part of the production. This is intuitive since Manufacturer can still learn by














Figure 4.1. Supplier’s profits under three options.
x2 can be positive or negative, which implies that even if Supplier has a lower cost
than Manufacturer, sometimes he cannot produce full demand, because Manufacturer
always wants to reserve some production in house for the purpose of learning. This
happens when the condition in Theorem 10 holds.
Whether the condition holds depends on many factors. Specifically speaking, it
holds when (a) average demand in Period 1 is large enough, or (b) the minimum
requirement for Manufacturer qMmin is small enough, or (c) the extra profit Manufac-
turer gets from learning GM(Q̄2) is large enough, or (d) the optimal cost reduction
for Manufacturer gM(εM
e
, δM) is small enough.
We make a couple of observations related to this outcome. First, if both firms
are symmetric, i.e., they have the same initial cost cM1 = c
S
1 , and the same learning
functions gM = gS, then Manufacturer always produces minimum quantity qMmin.
Secondly, if one firm produces everything in the first period, that firm will produce
everything in the second period, as well. The reason is that the other firm did not
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have the chance to learn, so the cost disadvantage remains there or becomes even
larger in the second period.
By comparing the centralized and decentralized problems, we found that in some
situations Manufacturer always produce more in the decentralized case. If we label
x2
d and x2
c as the thresholds for decentralized and centralized cases respectively, then
we have the following lemma.
Lemma 15 If gM > gS, then x2
d > x2
c.
Thus, if Manufacturer has a stronger learning ability, then Manufacturer is more
reluctant to outsource (even partially) in the decentralized case then in the centralized
case.
4.3.3 Effect of Parameter Changes
Effect of Variance: We also examine the effect of variance of learning on the outcome.
We find that both firms’ strategies only depend on the expectation of decrease in
cost, independent of variance.
For a given wholesale price, variance of Manufacturer’s cost-reducing function
gM(ε, δ) also does not influence Manufacturer’s quantity allocation and both firms’
effort decisions. Since Manufacturer’s second-period profit only depends on his own
cost, for a fixed wholesale price, only the expectation of future improvement matters,
thus the outsourcing and effort decisions remain the same.
However, the variance does have an impact on Supplier’s optimal wholesale price
decision, and thus on the final outcome. Supplier compares three options. For pro-
ducing 0 or Q1, the variance of g
M does not influence Supplier’s expected profit.
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However, for producing Q1 − qMmin, Supplier’s profit is larger if Manufacturer’s learn-
ing is more uncertain. This is because Supplier only makes positive profit in the
second period if his cost is lower than Manufacturer’s. With a larger variance of gM ,
there is a higher chance for this to happen. Therefore with a larger variance of
gM , x1 decreases, x2 increases, and Manufacturer is more likely to produce
minimum quantity qMmin.
Variance of Supplier’s cost-reducing function gs(ε, δ) has a similar but slightly
different effect. A larger variance also increases the probability that Supplier will
have a lower cost than Manufacturer in the second period, but this makes both
options of producing partially and producing everything at Supplier’s plant more
promising than before. In other words, As cost-reduction of Supplier becomes
more variable, x1 decreases, and outsourcing (at least partially) tends to
be more likely. Once the wholesale price is announced, it does not influence any
further decisions.
Profits change with costs: As shown in Figure 4.2, for a given cM1 , Supplier’s profit is
a decreasing convex function of cS1 . However, Manufacturer’s profit is not monotone
in cM1 . When Manufacturer produces Q1 or q
M
min, his profit is linearly decreasing in
his cost cM1 , regardless of Supplier’s cost. Similarly, when Manufacturer outsources
all demand, his profit is again linearly decreasing in his cost and independent of
Supplier’s cost. However, if a tiny increase in Manufacturer’s cost or a tiny decrease
in Supplier’s cost happens, so that Manufacturer starts to outsource all rather than
produce some amount in house, then Manufacturer’s profit dramatically increases.
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The amount of increase in profit is ( Q̄1
qMmin
− 1)GM(Q̄2).
Supplier’s profit is influenced by Manufacturer’s initial cost. As cM1 increases,
Supplier’s profit increases.
Manufacturer’s profit is only slightly influenced by Supplier’s initial cost. By
”slightly” we mean that as cS1 increases, Manufacturer’s profit does not change
unless Manufacturer switches to outsource some production from produc-










Figure 4.2. Manufacturer and Supplier’s profits change with costs.
Effect of demand in the first period Q1: We examine the effect of Q1 on x1 and x2
separately. x1 is the cost difference of Manufacturer and Supplier at which Supplier
is indifferent between producing 0 and Q1 − qMmin. With a larger demand in the
first period, Supplier still makes zero profit if he produces nothing, For the option
of producing partially, Supplier offers the same wholesale price ω1 = c
M
1 , invests the
same level of effort, and makes the same profit in the second period, but produces
more in the first period. As we have known that x1 < 0, so at c
M
1 − cS1 = x1 Supplier
loses money by producing in period one. He loses more if he produces more in the first
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period. Therefore as the demand in the first period increases, x1 increases,
and it is more likely to produce everything in Manufacturer’s facility than
producing at both places.
x2 is the cost difference between Manufacturer and Supplier, at which Supplier
is indifferent between producing partially versus producing everything. Again, for a
fixed wholesale price, Q1 has no impact on the subsequent decisions. Q1 only changes
the amount of production in the first period. For Supplier, the profit margin of
producing partially is greater than that of producing everything, so at cM1 − cS1 = x2,
as Q1 increases, Supplier’s profit increases more (or decreases less) if he produces
partial production. In other words, as Q1 increases, x2 increases, and it is more
likely to outsource partial production than to outsource all.
In summary, Manufacturer tends to produce more when demand in the first period
is larger.
Effect of demand in the second period Q2: The effect of Q2 on the outcome of the
game is not immediately clear. In general x1 and x2 can change in both directions.
For x1, we compare the option of outsourcing partially and not outsourcing at all.
Supplier always makes zero profit for the latter option, while for the former option
Supplier is more eager to learn and hopefully can make more profit in the second
period if demand is larger in the second period. However Manufacturer thinks in the
same way and also invests more to reduce cost. If this demand increases influences
Manufacturer’s learning more than Supplier’s, Supplier is worse off and thus is more
likely to give up production, while if it influences Supplier’s learning more, Supplier
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is better off and thus is more likely to produce some of the production.
Similarly, for x2, we compare the option of outsourcing partially and outsourcing
everything. As discussed above we are not clear whether a larger demand in the
second period makes the former option more or less promising. For the latter option,
demand change also affects Supplier’s profit in two ways. With a larger demand, on
one hand Supplier is more eager to learn and has a larger demand in the second period
if he produces, on the other hand, Manufacturer is also eager to learn, so Supplier
has to offer a much deeper discount in order for Manufacturer to give up production.
It is not immediately clear which of these two impacts dominates the other.
Effect of minimum quantity of Manufacturer qMmin:
At cM1 −cS1 = x1 < 0, a larger qMmin increases Supplier’s profit if he produces partial
demand in the first period. This is because Supplier loses profit by making Q1− qMmin
in the first period, and a larger qMmin reduces this profit loss while keeping all the other
decisions the same. Therefore as qMmin increases, x1 decreases, and it is more
likely to produce at both facilities than to produce everything in house.
Similarly, at cM1 − cS1 = x2, if Supplier produces partial demand, a larger qMmin in-
creases Supplier’s profit if x2 < 0, and decreases Supplier’s profit if x2 > 0. If Supplier
produces everything, since Supplier has to offer a discount ω1 = c
M
1 −GM ∗(Q2)/qMmin,
a larger qMmin allows Supplier to offer a higher wholesale price and thus increases his
profit. Therefore if x2 > 0, as q
M
min increases, x2 decreases, and it is more likely
to outsource everything than to produce at both facilities. If x2 < 0 it is




Effect of minimum quantity of Supplier qSmin: Since Manufacturer does not benefit
from Supplier’s learning, qSmin does not influence Manufacturer’s outsourcing deci-
sions, and thus has no effect on the game outcome.
4.3.4 A Special Example
In this section we look at an example with special cost-reducing functions: gM(ε, δ) =
a
√
ε, and gS(ε, δ) = b
√
ε. In this case learning activities at both firms are deterministic
and take a special square-root form. Coefficients a and b represent the ability of
learning, larger a and b imply stronger learning abilities.
The equilibrium outcome can be characterized in the following lemma: Note that
sometimes the outcome x1 = x2 is possible. In this case it is never optimal to both
make and buy. In the deterministic case, the necessary and sufficient condition for













Lemma 16 If the cost reducing functions take special forms gM(ε, δ) = a
√
ε, and
gS(ε, δ) = b
√
ε, let A =
1
4





a2)Q22, then there are four
cases of possible equilibrium outcome:
Case 1: Manufacturer produces (Q1, Q2) if c
M
1 − cS1 <
−B
Q1 + Q2
, and (0, 0) otherwise.




Q1 + Q2 − qMmin
, (qMmin, 0) if
−A
Q1 + Q2 − qMmin
≤ cM1 − cS1 <
B − A
qMmin
, and (0, 0) otherwise.
Case 3: Manufacturer produces (Q1, Q2) if c
M




and (0, 0) otherwise.
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Case 4: Manufacturer produces (Q1, Q2) if c
M







≤ cM1 − cS1 <
B − A
qMmin
, and (0, 0) otherwise.
Conditions for the four cases are as follows:
Case 1: B ≥ 0, A




Case 2: A ≥ 0, A














An example of situation which satisfies this condition could be a case when Man-
ufacturer can reduce his cost very significantly but the profit does not significantly in
the absolute terms, while Supplier gains significant extra profit due to learning, and
qMmin is close to Q1. In this case dual sourcing is not promising and only fully internal
production or full outsourcing can be optimal.
For the deterministic cost-reducing functions we can easily provide examples for













, so if B > A then x2 increases in Q2,
otherwise x2 decreases in Q2.
Similarly, note that x2 increases in q
M












− b2). Since B > 0 in this case, x2 decreases
in qMmin.
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4.4 Three-period Deterministic Problem
We extend our two-period model into three periods, but for analytical trackability,
we only consider a deterministic problem.
Manufacturer’s profit-to-go function is no longer monotone in cost when time
horizon is extended to three periods. Manufacturer may benefit from higher cost,
and consequently be reluctant to improve. Anticipating this response Supplier may
charge higher wholesale price and nonintuitive quantity allocations may appear in
the equilibrium.
Lemma 17 In the first period, (a) Manufacturer never produces (Q1 − qSmin)+, and
(b) Manufacturer produces Q1 − qSmin only when he produces (0, 0) in the next two
periods.
In this section, we analyze the case where the equilibrium quantity in the last two
periods could only be (Q2, Q3) or (0, 0). Analysis of the other scenarios is similar.
We say Supplier “fully participates” when (qM2 , q
M




Based on our analysis of two-period problem, Supplier fully participates only if cM2 −





0 if cM2 − cS2 < A
(cM2 − cS2 )(Q2 + Q3) + N otherwise
First we study a benchmark case where RM takes the same form as cM2 < c
S
2 +A for
all cM2 , i.e., R
M = (P2−cM2 )Q2 +(P3−cM3 )Q3 +GM ∗(Q3). Then Manufacturer’s profit
is independent of cS2 . Similar to two-period problem, Supplier invests ε
S∗(Q2 + Q3) if




(Q2 + Q3). When making production decision, Manufacturer produces q
M
1 = Q1













, and qM1 = 0 otherwise.
The equilibrium is given by comparing Supplier’s profits of the six options:
RS(Q1, Q2, Q3) = 0
RS(Q1, 0, 0) = 0 + (c
M
2 −∆cM(Q2 + Q3)− cS2 )(Q2 + Q3) + GS
∗
(Q3)
RS(qMmin, Q2, Q3) = (c
M
1 − cS1 )(Q1 − qMmin)
RS(qMmin, 0, 0) = (c
M





RS(0, Q1, Q2) = (ω1 − cS1 )Q1




Note that if RM takes the same form as cM2 > c
S
2 + A for all c
M
2 , i.e., R
M =





(Q3), the equilibrium is the same as above
since the marginal benefit of effort is unchanged.




2 −cS1 ≥ A−
GS
∗
(Q2 + Q3) + N
Q2 + Q3
=
A−D and otherwise invests no effort.
Lemma 19 If only Manufacturer can learn, then there exist E = ∆cM(Q2 +Q3) and
B ≥ 0 satisfying ( Q2
qMmin
−1)GM ∗(Q3)+fM−1(B)+B(Q2 +Q3) = GM ∗(Q2 + Q3), such




1 −cS2 < A+B or cM1 −cS2 > A+E, where
fM
−1
is the inverse function of fM and cS2 is Supplier’s second-period cost given by
cM1 , q
M
min and Lemma 18. Otherwise he invests f
M−1(cM1 − cS1 −A) and after learning
cM2 − cS2 = A (See Figure ??).
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Theorem 11 (a) for cM1 −cS1 < A−D or cM1 −cS1 ≥ A+E, the equilibrium is identical
to the benchmark case. (b) For A − D ≤ cM1 − cS1 < A + E, (Q1 − qSmin, 0, 0) may
take place in the equilibrium. (c) For A −D ≤ cM1 − cS1 < A + E, if the equilibrium
quantity qM1 = 0, then the wholesale price ω1 is higher than the one in the benchmark
case.
Since Manufacturer greatly benefits from Supplier’s full participation, he may
prefer keeping own cost at a higher level, providing Supplier more bargaining power
and thus increasing wholesale price.
Because the profit-to-go functions under optimal effort decisions are very irregular,
we cannot prove that the equilibrium quantity allocation is monotonic in initial costs
for three-period model. We can, however, show that only a subset of the allocations
are possible to appear in the equilibrium, and we offer the interpretation for each
possible allocation later.
Theorem 12 In three-period model, the only possible quantities in the equilibrium
are: (Q1, Q2, Q3), (q
M










min, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0),
(0, qMmin, 0), (Q1 − qSmin, 0, 0), (Q1, 0, 0), (Q1, qMmin, 0), and (0, qMmin, Q3). Furthermore,
if demands in each period are stationary, i.e., Q1 = Q2 = Q3, then (Q1, 0, 0),
(Q1, q
M
min, 0), and (0, q
M
min, Q3) are not possible in the equilibrium.
With non-stationary demand, it is easy to provide examples where the quantities
listed in Theorem 12 are possible:
• (0, qMmin, 0): Suppose Q1 << Q2, ∆cM(Q2+Q3) is large and GM ∗(Q2 + Q3) ≈ 0.
Then ω1 ≈ cM1 , since Q1 is small, the profit loss of offering discount is small,
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and qM1 = 0 can be optimal. In the second period, Q2 is large, so the profit loss
of offering discount is large as long as GM
∗










for 0 ≤ εM ≤ 8Q and fM = 5 otherwise. Assume qMmin = Q/4, then it




(2Q) = 2Q,M = 4Q,N = Q, it satisfies
the condition of scenario 3 in Theorem 1 with A1 = 0, A2 = 1, A3 = 12. For
4.5 < cM1 −cS1 < 5, compare the profit of Manufacturer for (0, qMmin, 0), (Q,Q, Q)
and (qMmin, Q, Q), we can verify that the equilibrium quantity is (0, q
M
min, 0).
With higher internal, most of the production takes place at Supplier. But
in the second period Manufacturer produces the minimum quantity to reduce
cost. With only one period to go, Manufacturer can only reduce cost by a small





(Q) = Q.) In the first period, however, Manufacturer wants to improve a
lot given more demand in the future. But the profit increase from cost reduction
is relatively small due to the high effort cost (∆cM
∗
(2Q) = 8, GM
∗
(2Q) = 2Q).
So Manufacturer is willing to accept a small discount to give up improvement.
• (Q1, 0, 0): Suppose Q1 >> Q2, fS = 0, and cM1 < cS1 . Then ω1 ≤ cM1 < cS1 , and
Supplier gets the order and incurs large profit loss due to the large quantity.





in order to benefit in Period 3. This example shows that when demands are
non-stationary and Supplier has higher cost, he has to strategically choose the
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time to step in the game, i.e., in the period with little demand so that he does
not need to lose too much.
The explanation for (Q1, q
M
min, 0) is similar.
• Example for (0, qMmin, Q3) when demands are not stationary:
Suppose fM(εM) = 1 for all εM , fS(εS) = εS if εS ≤ 1 and fS(εS) = 1 otherwise.
Let Q2 = 8, Q3 = 0.5, q
M
min = 1, then we can check that (0, q
M
min, Q3) is the
equilibrium quantity for −0.75 < cM1 − cS1 < 0.
In this example Q2 >> Q3. Although Manufacturer has bigger incentive to
learn in the first period than in the second one, Supplier prefers blocking Man-
ufacturer from learning by offering a significant discount. In Period 2, however,
Supplier does not improve any more with small demand in Period 3, only pro-
duces part of current-period demand, and gives up production in Period 3.
We can interpret the other possible quantity allocations as follows:
1. (Q1, Q2, Q3): Manufacturer has very low cost or very strong learning ability.
2. (qMmin, q
M
min, Q3) and (q
M
min, Q2, Q3): Manufacturer has high initial cost but strong
learning ability. He can exploit the Supplier’s low cost at the beginning but
finally match Supplier’s cost.




min, 0): Manufacturer wants to exploit Supplier’s strong
learning ability, but he reduces his own cost since it is the upper bound of
Supplier’s wholesale price.
4. (0, 0, 0): Supplier has very low cost or very strong learning ability.
5. (Q1 − qSmin, 0, 0): Supplier fully participates only if he is allowed to learn and
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Manufacturer’s next period cost is not too low. Thus, Manufacturer accepts a
wholesale price higher than his own cost, ω1 > c
M
1 , and invests less effort in
order to induce Supplier to fully participate.
In the two-period game, Manufacturer is always better off with lower Supplier
cost. One interesting question is whether Manufacturer is willing to help Supplier
improve. Consider the following revised game: Supplier offers wholesale price ω1, and
Manufacturer decides quantity. After that Manufacturer announces his own effort
level εM , and Manufacturer will offer effort εMS to help Supplier improve. Finally
Supplier decides his effort level εS. Supplier’s improvement is fS(εMS + εS), but he
only incurs effort cost εS, while Manufacturer incurs effort cost εM + εMS with cost
reduction fM(εM).
Observation 1 In a three-period game with deterministic additive cost-reducing func-
tions and the option of offering effort cost sharing, Manufacturer can be worse off
if (a) The conditions of scenario 4 in 1 are satisfied; (b) εS
∗
(Q2 − qMmin) = 0 ; (c)
A−D > 0 where A is the smallest cost difference cM2 − cS2 for (0, 0), and A−D is the
minimal cost difference cM2 − cS1 at which Supplier can earn nonnegative profit in the
last two periods by learning; (d)(
Q2
qMmin
− 1)GM ∗(Q3) > GM ∗(Q2 + Q3); and (e) There
exists cM1 − cS1 < A−D such that (0, 0, 0) is the optimal quantity.
Despite that Manufacturer always has the choice of sharing nothing, he may still
be hurt just by having the option of offering effort sharing. Manufacturer’s internal
learning is not as important as before since he has the option of helping Supplier
improve. Knowing this Supplier does not need to offer a wholesale price as low as
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before to gain the total production, hurting Manufacturer’s profit in the long run.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study a “make-or-buy” problem when both Manufacturer and Sup-
plier can invest in a costly effort to reduce production cost. This learning requires the
plant to produce a minimum amount of production to provide sufficient experience
for post-savings activities to take place. Although dual sourcing has been studied
before and various reasons have been provided for this decision, we provide a new ex-
planation for this phenomenon, which relates partial internal production to learning
objective that enable cost savings.
In the two-period problem, we have shown that depending on the cost difference
between Manufacturer’s and Supplier’s, Manufacturer can either fully outsource to
the Supplier, fully produce in house, or proceed with partial production and partial
outsourcing. We find that this dual sourcing is more likely when the learning process
is more uncertain, when Manufacturer’s minimum quantity required to learn is larger,
or when the two plants belong to the same company.
We extend the problem to three periods and find that the production quantity
can switch back and forth from full to partial outsourcing. Although Manufacturer
has no incentive to help Supplier learn in two periods, he does have such an incentive
in longer horizons. However, this is not always the case because sometimes simply




This dissertation is focused on the dynamic production and pricing decisions for
new products. The three essays contained in the dissertation provide theoretical re-
sults and numerical studies for three different aspects of new product decision making.
The first essay studies how a capacity constrained firm should price products
during new product introductions. using control-theory framework (a generalization
of the classic Bass model), I consider the integrated optimal pricing, production,
and sales decisions. I show that in most of the cases, the optimal trajectory of
demand is unimodal, as in the Bass model, but the optimal price trajectory can have
multiple local maxima when capacity is limited. Lack of pricing flexibility might
lead to intentional creation of backorders or lost sales, a phenomenon not observed
when price adjustments are allowed. I also explore when pricing flexibility is most
valuable using a numerical study. I find that benefits are highest when capacity is
not unlimited nor very little, and when imitation effect dominates innovation effect.
I also find that the capability to adjust prices is significantly more effective than the
option of producing in advance and holding inventory.
The second essay is focused on the production lot sizing decisions for a pharma-
ceutical firm that manufactures new medicines for clinical trial. I derive structural
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results on the optimal policy and show that under reasonable assumptions about the
yield distributions, the optimal production quantities are increasing in the number of
waiting orders and the remaining quantity to be produced for the current lot. I also
conduct a numerical study to compare the optimal average cost with several heuristic
policies commonly used in the industry. The results indicate that in most cases the
simple heuristic policies used in practice are very inefficient and substantial savings
can be obtained by appropriate lot sizing policies.
The third essay deals with outsourcing decisions when firms manufacture a new
product and production costs can be reduced through “learning-by-doing” effect. I
provide a new explanation for dual sourcing, which is driven by the fact that in-house
production may facilitate learning about potential process improvements leading to
eventual cost reductions.
These three essays deal with different issues that are important for new product





Main Proofs in Chapter 2
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: Applying Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle (Sethi and Thompson, 2000,
p. 33), a necessary condition for optimality is that there exist optimal d∗(t), D∗(t),
dB






= rλ(t) − ∂H
∂D
, and




∗(t)− log d∗(t)− c− 1 + λ(t)
we can obtain the optimal demand as a function of λ:
log d∗(t) = log dB








































Therefore, if r > 0, the trajectory of the optimal demand depends on λ: d∗(t) increases
if λ(t) > 0, and decreases if λ(t) < 0.
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er(t−u)d log d∗B(u) (A.4)




|t=T = −dlog dB(t)
dt
|t=T . Note first that dlog dB(t)
dt
|t=T > 0 is equivalent to
∂dB
∂D
|t=T > 0, i.e. , D(T ) < (q − p)m2q . Consider the following cases:
Case 1: D(T ) < (q − p)m
2q
Since dB(t) is unimodal in t,
dlog dB(t)
dt
|t=T > 0 implies dlog dB(t)
dt
> 0 for all
t ≤ T . By (A.4) λ(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Thus the optimal demand d∗(t)
is monotonically increasing in [0, T ].
Case 2: D(T ) ≥ (q − p)m
2q
In this case λ(T ) = 0 and
dλ
dt
|t=T ≥ 0. So λ(T − δ) ≤ 0 for small enough
δ > 0. We show first that there is at most one additional zero-point of λ(t)




|t=τ1 > 0 and
dλ
dt







|t=τ2 > 0, which is impossible given τ1 < τ2 and dB is unimodal.
Depending on the value of λ(0) we have two possibilities
Case 2.1: If λ(0) ≤ 0, then due to no other zero points, we must have λ(t) ≤ 0 for
all t, and the optimal demand d∗(t) monotonically decreases over
time.
Case 2.2: If λ(0) > 0, then there must exist τd ∈ [0, T ] such that λ(t) > 0 for t < τd
and λ(t) ≤ 0 otherwise. So the optimal demand d∗(t) first increases
and then decreases over time.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: From equation (A.1) and π(t) = log dB(t) − log d(t), we have π∗(t) =
1+ c−λ(t). Therefore π∗(t) increases if and only if λ(t) decreases. We will show that
λ(t) has a unique local maximum, by showing
d2λ
dt2












































= −(p + qD(t)/m)e−π(t) + q/m(m−D(t))e−π(t)
= (−(p + qD(t)/m) + q/m(m−D(t)))e−π(t)
= (q − p− 2qD(t)/m)e−π(t)
d2
dt2
log dB(t) = −2qd(t)e−π(t)/m− (q − p− 2qD(t)/m)e−π(t)dπ
dt
(A.5)






log dB(t) = 2q/md(t)e
−π(t) ≥ 0. Therefore
λ(t) has a unique local minimum and π∗(t) has a unique local maximum.





|t=T > 0. In this case λ is monotonically
decreasing, therefore π∗(t) monotonically increases.









|t=0 > 0, i.e. , rλ(0) − d
dt




)|t=0 = rλ(0)−mpeπ∗(0)(q/p−1)/m = rλ(0)−(q−p)eπ∗(0) >
100





|t=0 ≤ 0, i.e. , rλ(0) − d
dt
log dB(t)|t=0 ≤ 0, then there exists
τπ ∈ [0, T ], such that π∗(t) increases for t ∈ [0, τπ], and decreases
afterwards.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: We showed that d, dB and π are all unimodal. Furthermore, if we are forced
to set a fixed price, then the peak time τF is the same as the peak time of dB. Thus,










|τd ≥ 0, implying τd ≤ τF .
Since price π is maximized at the minimum of λ, we have
dλ
dt
|τπ = 0. Combined





|τπ ≤ 0. Thus,
τB ≤ τπ.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof: When the discount factor r = 0, equation (A.4) simplifies to
λ(t) = log dB
∗(T )− log dB∗(t) (A.6)
Substitute (A.6) into (A.1),
log d∗(t) = log dB
∗(t)− c− 1 + (log dB∗(T )− log dB∗(t)) = −1− c + log d∗B(T )
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Therefore d∗(t) is a constant, say d∗(t) = d̄ for all t, D(T ) = d̄T , and d̄ solves the
following equation:




(m− d̄T )(p + q
m
d̄T ) = e1+cd̄




{−(p− q)T − e1+c +
√
((p− q)T + e1+c)2 + 4pqT 2}
The optimal price is given by π(t) = log dB(t)− log d(t):
π(t) = 1 + c− λ(t) = 1 + c− (log dB(T )− log dB(t)) = 1 + c + log (m− d̄t)(p + q/md̄t)
(m− d̄T )(p + q/md̄T )
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5
















0 ≤ s(t) ≤ K, 0 ≤ s(t) ≤ d(t),
D(0) = S(0) = 0.
Again it is equivalent to finding the optimal d(t) and s(t). Denote unsatisfied















s̃(t) ≥ 0, (A.7)
0 ≤ s(t) ≤ K. (A.8)
Write Hamiltonian:
H(D,S, s(t), s̃(t), λ1, λ2, t) = (log dB(t)− log(s(t) + s̃(t))− c)s(t)
+λ1(t)(s(t) + s̃(t)) + λ2(t)s(t)
By Pontryagin Maximum Principle, λ1(T ) = 0 and
dλ1
dt












m−D∗(µ) ≥ 0, λ1(t) ≤ 0 for all
t ∈ [0, T ].





+ λ1(t) ≤ 0,
we have s̃∗(t) = 0 for all t, and d(t) = s(t) ≤ K.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: Define Hamiltonian H as:
H(D, d, λ, t) = (log dB(t)− log d(t)− c)d(t) + λ(t)d(t)
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By Maximum Principle, d∗(t) maximizes H subject to the constraint 0 ≤ d∗(t) ≤ K.
∂H
∂d
= log dB(t)− 1− c + λ(t)− log d(t)




= rλ(t), and λ(t) is positive, or M(t) increases, for t ≤ τd and negative,
M(t) decreases, for τd < t < T .




= 0 and satisfies the capacity constraint. In that case it is clear that
d∗(t) is first increasing and then decreasing.
If K < K̄, then let tA1 < t
A
2 be the times where M(t
A
1 ) = M(t
A
2 ) = log K. Then,
for t ∈ [0, tA1 ], d∗(t) = eM(t), which is increasing, and d∗(t) = eM(t) on [tA2 , T ], which is
decreasing, while d∗(t) = K on [tA1 , t
A
2 ],
Consider now the trajectory of price. On [0, tA1 ], demand log d
∗(t) = log dB(t) −
1 + λ(t)− c, so π∗(t) = log dB(t)− log d(t) = 1 + c− λ(t). Since λ(t) is decreasing on
[0, tA1 ], π
∗(t) is increasing on [0, tA1 ].
On [tA1 , t
A
2 ], optimal demand d
∗(t) = K, so π∗(t) = log dB(t)−log d(t) = log dB(t)−
log K. π∗(t) is unimodal on [tA1 , t
A
2 ] since dB(t) is unimodal.
On [tA2 , T ], log d
∗(t) = log dB(t) − 1 + λ(t) − c, so π∗(t) = log dB(t) − log d(t) =
1 + c− λ(t). As in Lemma 2, λ(t) has a unique local minimum on [tA2 , T ] Thus, π∗(t)
has a unique local maximum on [tA2 , T ]. and the theorem is proved.
104
A.7 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Lemma 5. Defining s̃(t) = d(t) − s(t) ≥ 0,
















I(t) ≥ 0, I(0) = 0,
0 ≤ x(t) ≤ K,
s̃(t) ≥ 0.
The Hamiltonian becomes:
H(D, S, s(t), s̃(t), λ1, λ2, λ3, t) = (log dB(t)− log(s(t) + s̃(t)))s(t)− cx(t)− hI(t)
+λ1(t)(s(t) + s̃(t)) + λ2(t)s(t) + λ3(t)(x(t)− s(t))













m−D∗(µ) ≥ 0, λ1(t) ≤ 0 for all





+ λ1(t) ≤ 0
Thus s̃∗(t) = 0 for all t, and d(t) = s(t).
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A.8 Proof of Lemma 7
Proof: (a) Since the Hamiltonian H in (10) is linear in x, if I∗(t) > 0, then x∗(t) = 0
or x∗(t) = K.
Assume I∗(t) > 0 and x∗(t) = 0 for an open interval [t1, t2]. Since I∗(t1) > 0,
there exist an open interval (s1, s2) before (t1, t2) such that I(s) > 0 and x
∗(s) = K
for s ∈ (s1, s2).1 Consider an alternative strategy where x̃(s) = K− δ for s ∈ (s1, s2),
and x̃(t) = δ ∗ (s2 − s1)/(t2 − t1) for t ∈ (t1, t2), where δ is a small positive number.
All other decisions remain the same. This strategy is still feasible. As demand is not
changed, the firm collects the same revenue, but incurs lower inventory holding cost
and production cost, which contradicts optimality of the original policy.




≥ 0, or equivalently, λ2(t) ≥ c.
(b) Let I∗(t) = 0 for a small open interval. Since I∗
′
(t) = 0, we have x∗(t) = d∗(t).
From Lemma 6, d∗(t) = s∗(t).
A.9 Proof of Lemma 8
Proof: Given the price and production strategy d(t) and x(t) on [0, T ], suppose
I(T ) > 0, which implies I(t) > 0 for an open interval t ∈ (T − s, T ). By Lemma
7, x(t) = K almost surely for all t ∈ [τ, T ]. Consider an alternative strategy where
d̃(t) = K − δ for all t ∈ (T − s, T ]. In such a case, D(t) is not changed, the diffu-
sion process is the same and the firm collects the same revenue. However, inventory
1We can always alter the production policy on a set of measure 0, and this is why we consider
the interval.
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costs decrease. Additionally, the alternative strategy saves production cost. There-
fore any production strategy with I(T ) > 0 is dominated, contradicting our original
assumption.
A.10 Proof of Lemma 9
Proof: The Lagrangian for this problem is
L(D, I, d, λ1, λ2, µ, η, t) = (log dB(t)− log d(t))d(t)− cx(t)− hI(t) + λ1(t)d(t) +




= rλ1 − ∂L
∂D






= rλ2 − ∂L
∂I
= rλ2 + h (A.10)
λ1(T ) = 0




∗(t)− log d∗(t)− 1 + λ1(t)− λ2(t)− η(t) = 0 (A.11)
∂L
∂x
= −c + λ2(t) + µ1(t)− µ2(t) + η(t) = 0
µ1(t) ≥ 0, µ2(t) ≥ 0, µ1(t)x∗(t) = 0, µ2(t)(K − x∗(t)) = 0
η(t) ≥ 0, dη
dt
≤ rη(t), η(t)I∗(t) = 0 (A.12)
If I∗(t) > 0, then by Lemma 7, λ2(t) ≥ c, x∗(t) = K. From Equation (A.12),
η(t) = 0. From Equation (A.11), log d∗(t) = log dB(t)− 1 + λ1(t)− λ2(t).
If I∗(t) = 0, since
∂H
∂x










= log dB(t) − log d(t) − 1 + λ1(t) − λ2(t),
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subject to the constraint d∗(t) ≤ K. Therefore, log d∗(t) = min{log K, log dB(t)−1+
λ1(t)− λ2(t)}.
If I∗(t) = 0 and λ2(t) < c, then H is decreasing in x, so x∗(t) = d∗(t). Substituting
d∗(t) for x∗ in H, we have
dH
dd
= log dB(t) − log d(t) − 1 + λ1(t) − c, subject to the
constraint d∗(t) ≤ K. Therefore, log d∗(t) = min{log K, log dB(t)− 1 + λ1(t)− c}.
A.11 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: We first prove the structure of the optimal demand and production trajec-
tories (part (a) and (c)):
1. By Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle λ2(T ) ≥ 0, and λ2(t) may have a negative
jump whenever inventory I(t) changes from positive to zero. We first show that
λ2(t) is piece-wise increasing.
Solving equation (A.10), for any maximal interval where λ2(t) is continuous,
we have λ2(t) = Ce
rt − h
r
, where C is a constant. We show that C is always
positive, which implies that λ2(t) is increasing on that interval. Note that at
the end of the interval t = t̄, either (i) λ2(t) has a negative jump, or (ii) t̄ is
the end of the horizon. (i) implies that inventory I changes from positive to
zero at t̄, and by Lemma 9, part 1, we have λ2(t̄
−) ≥ c ≥ 0. If t̄ = T , then
λ2(t̄) = λ2(T ) ≥ 0. Therefore, in both cases, C ≥ 0.
2. Let log d1(t) := log dB(t) − 1 + λ1(t) − c. Using the same logic as in the proof
of Lemma 1, we have log d1(t) is unimodal for all t ∈ (0, T ).
3. Let log d2(t) := log dB(t)−1+λ1(t)−λ2(t). We show that log d2(t) is unimodal
for any interval where λ2(t) is continuous by justifying that any local optimum
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is a local maximum. Consider the first derivative of log d2(t). Based on equation
(A.9) and λ2(t) = Ce
rt − h
r














+ rλ1(t)− dlog dB(t)
dt
− rCert = rλ1(t)− rCert
At the local optimum of log d2(t),
dlog d2(t)
dt
= 0, thus λ1(t) = Ce
rt ≥ 0. In
the proof of Lemma 1, we have shown that λ1(t) is decreasing if λ1(t) ≥ 0, thus
dλ1(t)
dt
≤ 0 at the local maximum of log d2(t).
We evaluate the second derivative of log d2(t) at
dlog d2(t)
dt







− r2Cert ≤ 0.
Thus, log d2(t) is unimodal.
4. We show that it is not possible for the three conditions to take place simulta-
neously on an open interval: d2(t) < K, d2(t) is decreasing, and λ2(t) ≥ c.
If these conditions take place on interval (t′, t′′), then they hold on (t′, T ).
λ2(t) ≥ c implies that x(t) = K (Lemma 9, parts 1 and 2). Combined with
d2(t) < K, we have
dI(t)
dt
> 0 on (t′, t′′). Since d2 is unimodal, we have
d2(t) < K on (t
′, T ). For x(t) < K, we need λ2(t) < c, for which we need
a jump down, which is only possible if I(t) = 0. The initial accumulation of
inventory combined with d(t) < K = x(t) makes it, however, impossible. Thus,
I(T ) > 0, which contradicts Lemma 8.
5. Based on the observations above, we consider the following cases depending on
the values of λ2(0) and d2(0):
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Case 1: If λ2(0) ≥ c and d2(0) < K:




Since I(T ) = 0, we define tB2 := min{t ∈ (0, T ]|I(t) = 0}. Lemma 9 implies
x∗(t) = K, d∗(t) = d2(t), and I(t) > 0 on (0, tB2 ). Since
dI(t)
dt





) ≥ K. As we have dI
dt




negative. Thus I∗(t) is unimodal for t ∈ [0, tB2 ].
λ2(t) may have a negative jump at t
B
2 . Recall that I(t
B
2 ) = 0 and either case 2
or 3 of Lemma 9 applies, depending on the value of the jump.




) ≥ c, then x∗(t) = K, d∗(t) = min(K, d2(t)) = K, and
dI
dt









) ≥ K, from Lemma 9, part 1, we have d2(tB2 +) ≥ d2(tB2 −) ≥




) ≥ c and d2(tB2 +) ≥ d2(tB2 −) ≥ K.
Note that if d2(t) drops below K at any t ≥ tB2 , then it is decreasing at that
point. However, since λ2(t) is increasing, we have λ2(t) ≥ c, which cannot hap-
pen simultaneously. Therefore in this case x∗(t) = d∗(t) = K, and I∗(t) = 0 for t ∈ (tB2 , T ).








for t ∈ (tB2 , tB2 + δ), where δ is a small positive number. Since λ2(tB2 −) ≥ c,
we have d1(t
B
2 ) ≥ d2(tB2 −) ≥ K. Therefore, we define maximum tB3 ≥ tB2 ,
such that d1(t
B
3 ) ≥ K, which implies x(t) = d(t) = K for t ∈ (tB2 , tB3 ) and
d1(t
B








, d2(t) is also decreasing for t ≥ tB3 , and we must have λ2(t) < c.
Thus x∗(t) = d∗(t) = K on (tB2 , t
B
3 ), and x
∗(t) = d∗(t) = d1(t) on (tB3 , T ).
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Case 2: If λ2(0) ≥ c and d2(0) ≥ K, the implication of Case 1.1. for tB2 = 0
applies and x∗(t) = d∗(t) = K, and I(t) = 0 for t ∈ (0, T ).
Case 3: If λ2(0) < c:
Then x∗(t) = d∗(t) = min(K, d1(t)) for t ∈ (0, tB1 ), where tB1 is the first time
such that λ2(t
B
1 ) = c. At t
B
1 , the situation becomes identical to case 1 or 2,
depending whether d1(t
B
1 ) < K or d1(t
B
1 ) ≥ K.
Case 3.1: If d1(t
B
1 ) < K, since λ2(t
B
1 ) = c, I(t
B
1 ) = 0, d2(t
B
1 ) = d1(t
B
1 ), the
trajectory after tB1 is as in Case 1.
Case 3.2: If d1(t
B
1 ) ≥ K, since λ2(tB1 ) = c, I(tB1 ) = 0, d2(tB1 ) = d1(tB1 ), the
trajectory after tB1 is as in Case 2.
Next we prove the structure of the optimal price trajectory (part (b)):
1. Let t′ ∈ (0, tB1 ) be the minimal t′ such that d1(t′) ≥ K. It t′ exists, we have Case
3.2 above and for all t ∈ [t′, T ], we have d(t) = K and thus π(t) = log dB(t) −
log d(t) = log dB(t)− log d(t), which clearly means that π(t) is unimodal.
Let t′′ = t′ if it exists and t′′ = tB1 otherwise. For t ≤ t′′: log d(t) = log d1(t) =
log dB(t) − 1 + λ1(t) − c, thus π(t) = log dB(t) − log d(t) = 1 + c − λ1(t). As
shown in the proof of Lemma 2, π(t) is increasing since log d(t) is increasing on
(0, t′′). When t′′ = t′ the price structure is already shown, thus consider t′′ = tB1 .
2. On t ∈ (tB1 , tB2 ), log d(t) = log d2(t) = log dB(t) − 1 + λ1(t) − λ2(t), we will
show that π(t) = log dB(t) − log d(t) = 1 − λ1(t) + λ2(t) is unimodal. Let



































. From equation (A.5),
d2
dt2











log dB(t) = −2q/md(t)e−π(t) ≤ 0.
3. On t ∈ (tB2 , tB3 ), d(t) = K, thus π(t) = log dB(t) − log K, which is unimodal.
We show that if π(t) is (already) decreasing at tB2
−
, then it is also decreasing
at tB2
+
, so π(t) is unimodal on (tB1 , t
B
3 ).
































≤ 0. From the proof of Lemma 2, λ1(t)




) = log dB(t
B
2 ) − log K
is also decreasing at tB2
+
.
4. On t ∈ (tB3 , T ), log d(t) = log d1(t) = log dB(t) − 1 + λ1(t) − c, thus π(t) =
1 + c− λ1(t). As shown in the proof of Lemma 2, π(t) is unimodal.
A.12 Proof of Lemma 10
Proof: 1. If I(t) > 0 on an open interval, applying similar argument as in the proof
of Lemma 7, we have x∗(t) = K almost surely.
2. If I(t) = W (t) = 0 on an open interval, then
dI(t)
dt
= x(t) − s(t) = 0 and
dW (t)
dt
= ξ(d(t)− s(t)) = 0. Therefore, s∗(t) = x∗(t) = d∗(t) and part (c) holds.
3. If W (t) > 0 on an open interval and b > rc, then by equation (2.11), the
Hamiltonian is linear in s(t). If (i) I(t) > 0, then s∗(t) = 0 or s∗(t) = +∞. If (ii)
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I(t) = 0, then s(t) = 0 or s(t) = x(t) = K.
(i) Assume I(t) > 0. s∗(t) = +∞ is not sustainable on a positive time interval.
Thus, s∗(t) = 0 is the only possibility. Applying the same logic as in the proof
of Lemma 7, we have x(t) = c. An alternative strategy is to sell s∗(t) = ε and
x∗(t) = K on (t1, t1 + δ), where ε is a small positive number, while x∗(t) = x∗(t) + ε
for (t2, t2 + δ) where t2 is the first t2 ≥ t1 + δ such that x(t2) < c. In this case,
the firm saves backordering cost, inventory holding cost, and benefits from increased
cumulative sales. Therefore s∗(t) = 0 cannot be optimal. Thus I(t) = 0 whenever
W (t) > 0 on a positive interval (which completes part (a)).
(ii) Let I(t) = 0. Note that I(t) = 0 and s(t) = 0 on (t1, t1 + δ), where δ is a small
positive number, cannot be jointly optimal.
When I(t) = 0, applying similar logic as in the proof of Lemma 7, we have x(t) =
s(t). Assume x(t) < K. W,D, S, I can be approximated by W (t+δ) ≈ W (t)+ξδd(t),
D(t + δ) ≈ D(t) + δd(t), S(t + δ) = S(t) and I(t + δ) = I(t). Consider an alternative
strategy to sell x∗(t) = s∗(t) = x(t) + ε on (t1, t1 + δ) where ε is a small positive
number. In this case, W,D, S can be approximated by W (t+δ) ≈ W (t)+ξδd(t)−εδ,
S(t + δ) = S(t) + εδ, D(t + δ) ≈ D(t) + δd(t) and I(t + δ) = I(t). Since b > rc, the




= rλ2(t) − ∂H
∂S
= rλ2(t) − q/m
p + qS(t)/m
ξd(t). Note that
λ2(t) is continuous and λ2(T ) = 0. If λ2(t) = 0 for some t ∈ [0, T ], then dλ2(t)
dt
< 0,
implying that there would be no other 0-points of λ2(t) and λ2(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Thus the firm would also benefit from the increased cumulative sales, which implies
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s∗(t) = K is optimal when W (t) > 0.
A.13 Compare myopic sales policy with delay sales policy
We first study the myopic sales policy. Under myopic sales policy, at time t = 0, the
cumulative demand is given by D(t) = pm(e(p+q)t−1)/(q +pe(p+q)t). We solve for the
time at which inventory is depleted: D(τ1) = cτ1, and obtain τ1 = 0.57. The profit




0 (ad(t) − h(ct −D(t)))e−rtdt =
73.918. In the second phase, demand is constrained until d(τ2) = c. The cumulative
demand D(t) = m−(m−D1)e(p+q/m(D1−cτ1)τ1+ q2mcτ 21 −(p+q/m(D1−cτ1))t− q2mct2)
where D1 = D(τ1). solving for τ2, we have τ2 = 14.89. The profit in the second phase





ace−rtdt = 1724.59. Finally, demand drops below
capacity, D(t) = m/q(q − (p + q/m(S2 − D2))e−(t+Constant3)(p+q/m(S2−D2)+q))/(1 +
e−(t+Constant3(p + q/m(S2 −D2) + q))), where S2 = D1 + c(τ2 − τ1), D2 = D(τ2), and
Constant3 = 1/(p+q/m(S2−D2)+q) log((p+q/m(S2−D2)+D2q/m)/(q−D2q/m))−









Then we examine the profit if we intentionally delay sales. That is, for t ∈ [0, τ ] =
[0, 5], customers come to purchase but the firm does not sell to them even if inventory
is available. The profit in the first phase [0, 5] is 0. In the second phase, the cumulative
demand is given by D(t) = m/q(q−(p+q/m(S0−D0))e−(t+Constant1)(p+q/m(S0−D0)+q))/(1+
e−(t+Constant1)(p+q/m(S0−D0)+q)), where D0 = m(1 − e−pτ ), S0 = 0, and Constant1 =
1/(p+q/m(S0−D0)+q) log((p+q/m(S0−D0)+D0q/m)/(q−D0q/m))−τ . The time
that inventory is depleted τ1 = 11.356. The profit during the second phase [τ, τ1] is
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Πdelay1 = 1348.87. Then demand is constrained and the time demand drops below ca-
pacity τ2 = 16.84. Profit during the third phase [τ1, τ2] is Π
delay
2 = 619.25. Finally de-
mand drops below capacity and the profit during this phase [τ2,∞] is Πdelay3 = 343.79.




3 = 2311.92 ≥ Πmyopic. Thus myopic
sales policy is dominated.
A.14 Lemma for the Proof of Theorem 3
Denote log d1(t) = log dB(t)−1+ 1
ξ
λ1(t)+λ4(t), log d2(t) = log dB(t)+λ1(t)+λ2(t)−
λ3(t), log d3(t) = log dB(t) + λ1(t) + λ2(t) − c, and πi(t) = log dB(t) − log di(t) for
i = 1, 2, 3.
Lemma 20 If b > rc, then the optimal demand is given by
(a) If W (t) > 0 and I(t) = 0, then log d∗(t) = log dB(t)− 1 + 1
ξ
λ1(t) + λ4(t).
(b) If W (t) = 0 and I(t) > 0, then log d∗(t) = log dB(t)− 1 + λ1(t) + λ2(t)− λ3(t).
(c) If W (t) = 0 and I(t) = 0, then log d∗(t) = min(log K, log dB(t) − 1 + λ1(t) +
λ2(t)− c).






= ξ(log dB(t) − log d(t) − 1) + λ1(t) + ξλ4(t) by equation (2.11). Setting
it to zero, we have log d∗(t) = log dB(t)− 1 + 1
ξ
λ1(t) + λ4(t).









= log dB(t)− log d(t)− 1 + λ1(t) + λ2(t)− λ3(t) by equation (2.11).
Setting it to zero, we have log d∗(t) = log dB(t)− 1 + λ1(t) + λ2(t)− λ3(t).
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= log dB(t) − log d(t) − 1 + λ1(t) + λ2(t) − c by equation
(2.11). Setting it to zero, we have log d∗(t) = log dB(t)− 1 + λ1(t) + λ2(t)− c. Since
0 ≤ x(t) ≤ K, log d∗(t) = min{log K, log dB(t)− 1 + λ1(t) + λ2(t)− c}.
A.15 Lemma for the Proof of Theorem 3




≥ 0 whenever dlog d1(t)
dt
= 0, then d1(t) is unimodal on [0, T ].
(c) π1(t), π2(t) and π3(t) are unimodal whenever they are optimal.
Proof:
1. d3(t) is unimodal: Since I(t) = W (t) = 0 and d



































is positive-negative, and λ1(T ) = λ2(T ) = 0, by
similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 1, there exists at most one t ∈ [0, T )
such that λ1(t) + λ2(t) = 0, and λ1(t) + λ2(t) is positive on [0, t) and negative
on (t, T ). Therefore d3(t) is increasing on [0, t) and decreasing on (t, T ).
2. π3(t) is unimodal: π3(t) = log dB(t)−log d3(t) = 1+c−λ1(t)−λ2(t). If dπ3(t)
dt
=
0 for some t, then
dπ3(t)
dt
= −d(λ1 + λ2)
dt









= −rd(λ1 + λ2)
dt








therefore π3(t) is unimodal.
3. d2(t) and π2(t) are unimodal: Since I(t) > 0, W (t) = 0, x
∗(t) = K, and s∗(t) =
d∗(t), the unimodality of d2(t) and π2(t) can be shown with the same logic as
in the proof of Theorem 2.



































































































Therefore log d1(t) is unimodal.
5. π1(t) is unimodal: π1(t) = log dB(t)− log d1(t) = 1− 1
ξ
λ1(t)− λ4(t). Let λ(t) =
1
ξ
λ1(t) + λ4(t). We show that
d2λ(t)
dt2









































= (p + qs(t)/m)e−π(t) ≥ 0. Therefore π1(t) is
unimodal.
A.16 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: We first show that if W (t) = 0 and d(t) < K for an open interval, then
s(t) = d(t) on this interval. Note that s(t) < d(t) for an open interval (t′, t′′), implies
W (t) > 0 and, by Lemma 10, we have s(t) = K > d(t), resulting in a contradiction.
The optimal demand trajectory can be characterized as follows. Since W (0) = 0,
if d3(0) ≤ K, then d∗(t) = min(d3(t), K) until some tC1 , when similar to the case
in Theorem 2, demand switches to d∗(t) = d2(t). As we have shown in Lemma 10,
W (t) = 0, when I(t) > 0, demand cannot switch to d1(t). Therefore d
∗(t) = d2(t)
until tC2 , where I(t
C
2 ) = 0.
While I(t) = 0 and W (t) = 0, we have d∗(t) = min(d3(t), K). If d∗(tC2 ) = d3(t
C
2 ) ≤
K, since d3(t) is unimodal, it will continue to be smaller than K. We have shown
in Theorem 2 that demand cannot switch back to d2(t) (i.e., I(t) > 0), and we have
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also shown that s(t) = d(t) as long as W (t) = 0 and d(t) < K, therefore demand
cannot switch to d1(t). Thus d
∗(t) = d3(t) for t ∈ (tC2 , T ).
If d3(t
C
2 ) > K, then d
∗(t) = K until tC3 , where demand may switch to d1(t). As
shown in Lemma 21, d1(t) is unimodal. At t
C
4 , W (t
C
4 ) = 0, and demand switches
back to min(d3(t), K). As backlogging is cleared, d3(t
C
4 ) ≤ K, and by the argument
above, demand also cannot switch back to d1(t).
For the optimal price trajectory, Lemma 21 has shown that π1(t), π2(t) and π3(t)
are unimodal. Therefore, π∗(t) is unimodal on (tC3 , t
C
4 ) and (t
C
4 , T ). Using similar
logic as in the proof of Theorem 2, we can show that π∗(t) is also unimodal on (0, tC3 ).
In a make-to-order environment, h = +∞, therefore, it is not possible to carry
inventory and tC1 = t
C















the case for make-to-order environment and partial backlogging is proved.
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APPENDIX B
Main Proofs in Chapter 3
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof : To prove the structure of optimal policy, we use value iteration.
Let H0(i,D, N) = 0 for all (i,D, N). For any k ≥ 1, define Lk−1(i, N) = N ∗













k−1(i + 1, D − y,N + N ′)dF (Q, y), then Hk(i,D, N) =
Lk−1(i, N) + minQ∈Π(D) Kk−1(i,D, N,Q), and H(i,D, N) = limk→∞ Hk(i,D,N).
We prove the theorem by induction. The theorem holds obviously for H0, and
Q∗0 exists and increases in D and N . Assume it is true for Hk−1:
1. Hk−1(i,D, N) is nonnegative;
2. Hk−1(i,D, N) increases in D;
3. Hk−1(i,D, N) increases in N .
We take first and second derivatives of K with respect to Q, and show the second
derivative is positive under conditions (a) and (b), therefore there exists an optimal
lot size Q.

















Hk−1(i + 1, D − y, N + N ′)dF ′Q(i, Q, y)









k−1′(i + 1, D − y, N + N ′)F ′Q(i, Q, y)dy




Prob(N ′)[Hk−1(i + 1, 0, N + N ′)F ′Q(i, Q,D)





k−1′(i + 1, D − y, N + N ′)F ′Q(i, Q, y)dy









k−1′(i + 1, D − y, N + N ′)F ′Q(i, Q, y)dy
−Hk−1(i + 1, D − aQ,N + N ′)(F ′Q(i, Q, aQ) + F ′y(i, Q, aQ)a)] (B.5)
Since F (i, Q, aQ) = 0 for any i, Q, F ′Q(i, Q, aQ) + aF
′






















k−1′(i + 1, D − y, N + N ′)F ′′Q(i, Q, y)dy
−HDk−1′(i + 1, D − aQ,N + N ′)F ′Q(i, Q, aQ)a] (B.7)
Since Hk−1 is nonnegative and increasing in D, and F is decreasing and convex on
Q by condition (a),
∂2Kk−1
∂Q2
≥ 0. So K is a convex function of Q and Kk−1 →∞ as
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Q →∞, and thus there exists an optimal Q∗k−1(i,D, N) ∈ Ω(D).
We then show that the cross derivatives of Kk−1 with respect to (Q,D) and (Q,N)
are both negative under condition (a) and (b), and thus the optimal policy increases









Hk−1(i + 1, D − y, N + N ′)F ′′Qy(i, Q, y)dy










k−1′(i + 1, D − y,N + N ′)F ′′Qy(i, Q, y)dy
+H(i + 1, 0, N + N ′)F ′′Qy(i, Q, D)










k−1′(i + 1, D − y, N + N ′)F ′′Qy(i, Q, y)dy
−HN k−1′(i + 1, D − aQ,N + N ′)F ′y(i, Q, aQ)a ≤ 0 (B.10)






] is a convex set increasing
in D, Q∗ also increases in D.
Then we prove that the three hypotheses also hold for Hk. Clearly Hk(i,D, N) is
nonnegative for all (i,D, N).
Lk−1(N) increases in N . Since Hk−1 is nonnegative and increasing in N , Hk is
still increasing in N after taking expectation and minimization.
Lk−1(N) is constant relative to D. Kk−1 is still increasing in D after taking









Kk−1 is also increasing in D.















1. For D1 < D2, if both K
k−1(Q, i, D1, N) and Kk−1(Q, i,D2, N) are constrained
by the lower bound, since Kk−1 is convex in Q, then Kk−1(Q, i, D1, N) is in-
creasing for any Q ≥ D1. Since Kk−1(Q, i, D, N) is increasing in D, we have
Kk−1(D1, i, D1, N) ≤ Kk−1(D2, i, D1, N) ≤ Kk−1(D2, i, D2, N).
2. If only Kk−1(Q, i, D2, N) is constrained by the lower bound, then Kk−1(Q∗(D1), i, D1, N) ≤
Kk−1(Q∗(D2), i, D2, N) ≤ Kk−1(D2, i, D2, N).
3. If only Kk−1(Q, i,D1, N) is constrained by the lower bound, as Kk−1 is convex
in Q, Kk−1(Q, i, D1, N) is increasing for any Q ≥ D1. Since D1 ≤ D2 ≤ D2/b ≤
Q∗(D2) and Kk−1(Q, i, D, N) is increasing in D, we have Kk−1(D1, i, D1, N) ≤
Kk−1(Q∗(D2), i, D1, N) ≤ Kk−1(Q∗D2, i, D2, N).
Therefore Hk(i,D,N) is increasing in D.
By induction a unique Q∗ exists and increases in D and N .
B.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof: We prove the theorem by induction. H0 = 0 is concave in D. Assuming that
Hk−1 is concave in D, we prove the results in three steps. First we show that if the
optimal lot size satisfies the first-order condition (FOC), then Hk is also concave in
D. Then we show Q∗/D is decreasing in D, therefore as D increases, Q∗ changes from
D/a to FOC solution to D. Finally we show that if Q∗ = D/a or Q∗ = D, Hk is still
concave, and the first order derivative of Hk at the transition points is continuous,
therefore Hk is concave. In each step, we first prove for r being non-integer, and then
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complete the proof for integer r. For the purpose of clarity we omit the production
run number i here, and the proof will not change if i is added.
1. If the optimal Q∗ satisfies FOC, and r is not an integer, then Hk is concave:
Assume n < r < n + 1, where n is an integer, n ≥ 1.
Hk(D, N) = Lk−1(N) + min
Q∈Π(D)
Kk−1(Q,D, N)
Kk−1(Q,D, N) = cMQ + EN ′
∫ D
0




The first-order condition is:
∂Kk−1
∂Q





Hk−1(D − y,N + N ′)ryr−1dy = 0







Hk−1(D − y, N + N ′)ryr−1dy)
1
r + 1
And the optimal cost difference function Hk is
Hk
∗
= Lk−1(N) + (cM(r2 + r−2)EN ′
∫ D
0
Hk−1(D − y, N + N ′)ryr−1dy)
1
r + 1
Denote Pr = EN ′
∫ D
0 H
k−1(D − y,N + N ′)yrdy, we will show in the following
that (Pr−1)
1
r + 1 is concave, and thus Hk is concave in D.
Notice that for any non-integer r, Pr has the following properties: (a) Pr ≥ 0,
(b) limD→0 Pr = 0, and (c)
∂Pr
∂D


















Hk−1(D − y, N + N ′)ryr−1dy = rPr−1
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Take the second derivative of (Pr−1)
1










































∗[(r − 2)(r − 1)Pr−1Pr−3 − r(r − 1)Pr−2Pr−2]
The first two terms in the above equation is nonnegative. Denote the third term
by S(0) = (r− 2)(r− 1)Pr−1Pr−3− r(r− 1)Pr−2Pr−2, and we will show S(0) ≤ 0.
If 1 < r < 2, then clearly S(0) ≤ 0;
If 2 < r < 3, then limD→0 S(0) = 0, and
∂S(0)
∂D
= (r + 1)(r − 2)(r − 3)Pr−1Pr−4 + (r − 2)(r + 1)(r − 1)Pr−2Pr−3
−2r(r − 1)(r − 2)Pr−2Pr−3
= (r + 1)(r − 2)(r − 3)Pr−1Pr−4 − (r − 2)(r + 2)(r − 1)Pr−2Pr−3 ≤ 0
In general, for n < r < n + 1, the (n− 1)th derivative of S(0) is:
∂(n−1)S(0)
∂D(n−1)
= x1Pr−n−2Pr−1 + S(1)
where S(1) is a linear combination of terms: Pr−n−1Pr − 2, Pr−nPr − 3.....,
limD→0 S(1) = 0, and x1 = (r + 1)(r − 2) ∏n+1i=3 (r − i) < 0.
If S(1) ≤ 0, then ∂
(n−1)S(0)
∂D(n−1)







≤ 0 and S(0) ≤ 0.
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x2Pr−2Pr−n−2 + S(3). Iteratively we take
∂S(k−1)
∂D
= xkPr−kPr−n−2 + S(k) for
any k ≤ n. Then we can show that xk ≤ 0 for any k ≤ n:



























(r − i)((r + 1)( (k + n− 2)!
(k − 1)!(n− 1)! +
(k + n− 2)!
(k − 3)!(n + 1)!)− 2r
(k + n− 2)!







(r − i) (k + n− 2)!
(k − 1)!(n + 1)!
((r + 1)(n(n + 1) + (k − 1)(k − 2))− 2r(k − 1)(n + 1))
For r = n, ((r + 1)(n(n + 1) + (k− 1)(k− 2))− 2r(k− 1)(n + 1)) = (n + 1)(n +
1− k)(n + 2− k) ≥ 0 for k ≤ n.
For r = n + 1,
((r + 1)(n(n + 1) + (k − 1)(k − 2))− 2r(k − 1)(n + 1))
= ((n + 2)(n(n + 1) + (k − 1)(k − 2))− 2(n + 1)(k − 1)(n + 1))
= (n + 2)(k − 1)2 − (2(n + 1)2 + (n + 2))(k − 1) + n(n + 1)(n + 2)
The above expression can be viewed as a function of k. At k = n, the value is
3 ≥ 0. The first derivative at k = n is −3n− 8 < 0, therefore it is positive for
all k ≤ n.
Since ((r+1)(n(n+1)+(k−1)(k−2))−2r(k−1)(n+1)) is a linear function of
r and is positive at both r = n and r = n+1, it is positive. Since r−n−1 < 0,
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we conclude that xk ≤ 0.
For k = n,
∂S(n−1)
∂D
= xnPr−nPr−n−2 + xn+1Pr−n−1Pr−n−1. We have shown that
xn ≤ 0. Now we show that xn+1 ≤ 0.


























(r − i) (2n− 2)!







(r − i) (2n− 2)!
n!(n− 1)!(n− 1− r) < 0
So limD→0 S(n−1) = 0 and
∂S(n−1)
∂D
≤ 0, thus S(n−1) ≤ 0. Similarly, for any k if
S(k+1) ≤ 0, then ∂S
(k)
∂D
= xk+1Pr−kPr−n−2 + S(k+1) ≤ 0. Since limD→0 S(k) = 0,
we have S(k) ≤ 0. By induction S(0) ≤ 0. Therefore ∂
2V k
∂D2
≤ 0 and V k is
concave in D.
2. If the optimal Q∗ satisfies FOC, and r is an integer, then Hk is concave:
Define P−1 = EN ′Hk−1(D, N + N ′), P−2 = EN ′Hk−1D
′





(D,N + N ′), then the following properties of Pr are different:
(a) limD→0 Pr = 0 for r ≥ 0.




= rPr−1 for r >= 1, and
∂Pr
∂D
= Pr−1 for r = 0,−1,−2.
And the proof needs to be modified in the following way:
∂(n−1)S(0)
∂D(n−1)
= x1P−3Pr−1 + S(1)





xkPr−kP−3 + S(k), where




















(r − i) (k + r − 2)!
(k − 1)!(r + 1)!(r + 1)(r + 1− k)(r + 2− k) ≥ 0
For k ≤ r we have limD→0 S(k) = 0.
∂S(r+1)
∂D
= xr+1P0P−2 + xr+2P−1P−1, where


























(r − i) (2r − 2)!
r!(r − 1)!((r + 1)(r − 1)− r
2) < 0
























(r − i) (2r − 1)!
(r + 1)!(r − 1)!((r + 1)(r + 1 + r − 1)− 2r(r + 1)) = 0
So S(r+1) ≤ 0. By similar argument ∂
2V k
∂D2
≤ 0 and V k is concave in D.
3. If r is not an integer, then Q∗/D decreasing in D:









|Q=D1 > 0, and thus
∂Kk−1(Q,D2, N)
∂D
|Q=D2 > 0, and
Q∗(D2) = D2.
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Thus we need to show
∂Kk−1(Q,D, N)
∂D






















= −(r + 1) Pr−1
Dr+2





((r − 1)DPr−2 − (r + 1)Pr−1)
Let S(0) = (r − 1)DPr−2 − (r + 1)Pr−1, we will show S(0) ≤ 0 using similar




x2Pr−1−n, where x1 =
∏n+1













is increasing in D.
4. If r is an integer, then Q∗/D decreasing in D:













((DP−1 − (r + 1)P0)










= DP−3 − P−2 + P−2 = DP−3 ≤ 0. Thus S(0) ≤ 0.






(r − i)DP−3 + r
r−1∏
i=1




all k ≤ n. So S(0) ≤ 0 and ∂K
k−1
∂D
(Q,D, N)|Q=D is increasing in D.
5. If r is not an integer, and if Q∗ = D or Q∗ = D/a, then Hk is concave:
If Q∗ = D/a, then Hk = Lk−1(N) + cMD/a, which is clearly concave in D.






Hk−1(D−y, N +N ′)yr−1dy.
It is sufficient to show
Pr−1
Dr
is concave in D.
















((r − 1)(r − 2)D2Pr−3 − (2r + 1)(r − 1)DPr−2 + r(r + 1)Pr−1)
Let S(0) = (r− 1)(r− 2)D2Pr−3− (2r + 1)(r− 1)DPr−2 + r(r + 1)Pr−1, we will








(r − i) ≤ 0
x2 = 2(r − 1)(r − 2)
n∏
i=3







(r − i)(2n− 3− 2r) ≤ 0
x3 = −(2r + 1)(r − 1)
n−1∏
i=2







(r − i)(−(n + 1)(2r + 1) + r + 1) ≤ 0
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(r − i) ≥ 0, P−3 ≤ 0
x2 = 2(r − 1)(r − 2)
r−1∏
i=3







(r − i)(2r − 1− 2r) ≤ 0
x3 = −(2r + 1)(r − 1)
r−1∏
i=2







(r − i)(−r) ≤ 0
7. The first derivative of Kk is continuous:
If there exists D such that Q∗(D) = D/a for D ≤ D, and Q∗(D) satisfies the




















Similarly, if there exists D such that Q∗(D) = D for D ≥ D, and Q∗(D) satisfies







By steps 1− 7 the theorem is proved.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof: If a = 0,
H(i,D,N) + g/µ = Lk−1(i, N) + min
Q∈Ω(D)
Kk−1(Q, i, D, N)















Hk−1(i + 1, D − y, N + N ′)dF (i, Q, y)}
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H0 = 0 is constant relative to cW , λ, T and Y . Assume H
k−1 increases in cW , λ,









Hk−1(i,D − y,N + N ′)dF ′Q(i, Q, y)(B.11)
Note that dF ′Q(i, Q, y) = F
′′
Qy(i, Q, y)dy ≤ 0.

























3. If production time T is stochastically larger, then Hk−1 is larger, W and
Wnew are larger, and N
′ is stochastically larger. As
∫ D
0 H
k−1(i,D − y,N +
















k−1(i,D − y, N + N ′)dF ′Q(i, Q, y) =
∫ D
0 H
k−1(i,D − y,N +




Since Kk−1(Q, i, D, N) is convex in Q, if
∂Kk−1
∂Q
decreases, then the optimal Q∗k−1
increases.
We then prove Hk also increases if cW , λ increases, or if the time for each produc-
tion run T stochastically increases, or if the yield Y stochastically decreases.
1. If cW increases: then H
k−1 is larger, W and Wnew are larger, thus Hk is larger.












k−1(i,D− y, N + N ′)dF (i, Q, y) is larger. Therefore
Hk is larger.
3. If production time T is stochastically larger, then Hk−1 is larger, W and
Wnew are larger, and N
′ is stochastically larger. As
∫ D
0 H
k−1(i,D − y,N +







y, N + N ′)dF (i, Q, y) is larger. Therefore Hk is larger.
4. If the yield Y is stochastically smaller, Hk−1 is larger. As Hk−1(i,D−y,N +N ′)
is an decreasing function of y,
∫ D
0 H
k−1(i,D − y, N + N ′)dF (i, Q, y) is larger.
Therefore Hk is larger.
Therefore by induction Q∗ increases.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 7
Proof: Let H̃(i, D − y, N + N ′) = min[H(i + 1, D − y, N + N ′), C(D − y)]. Let
H0(i,D,N) = 0 for all (i,D,N). Assume it is true for Hk−1 and each i:
1. Hk−1(i,D, N) is nonnegative;
2. Hk−1(i,D, N) increases in D;
3. Hk−1(i,D, N) increases in N .
Then H̃k−1 is nonnegative and increases in D and N for each i. Follow similar steps
as in the proof of Theorem 4, we can show that a unique optimal Q∗i exists and
increases in D, N .
Since H(i + 1, D − y, N + N ′) is increasing in N , and C(D − y) is constant with
respect to N , then there exists a threshold N̄(D − y), such that the firm outsources
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if and only if N + N ′ > N̄(D − y).
B.5 Proof of Theorem 8
Proof: Define H̃(i,D− y, N + N ′) = min[H(i + 1, D− y, N + N ′), AS + cS(D− y)],
then H̃ is nonnegative and increasing in D. If the yield is stochastically proportional
power distribution, follow similar steps in the proof of Theorem 5, we can show that
H̃ is increasing and concave in D.
Since CS(D − y) = AS + cS(D − y) is linearly increasing in D − y, let Ā =
H(i + 1, 0, N + N ′), then if AS ≤ Ā, H(i + 1, D − y,N + N ′) and AS + cS(D − y)
interact at most once (as a function of D − y), and thus there exists a threshold D̄
such that subcontracting achieves minimum if and only if D − y ≤ D̄.
Furthermore, when the queue length N increases, H(i+1, D−y, N+N ′) increases,
while CS(D−y) = AS+CS(D−y) remains constant. Therefore the threshold increases
with larger N .
If A > Ā, then H(i + 1, D− y, N + N ′) and AS + cS(D− y) may interact at most
twice (as a function of D − y), and thus there exist two thresholds D ≤ D̄ such that
subcontracting achieves minimum if and only if D ≤ D − y ≤ D̄.
Furthermore, when the queue length N increases, H(i+1, D−y, N+N ′) increases,
while CS(D − y) = AS + CS(D − y) remains constant. Therefore the threshold D
decreases and D̄ increases with larger N .
Since the minimum of a linear function and a concave function function is still
concave, we have H̃(i,D− y,N +N ′) is still concave, which completes the induction.
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B.6 Proof of Theorem 9
Proof: For each N , we need to compare H(i, D,N) and CO(D) to make the
overtime decisions. Note that limD→0 H(i, D,N) = N ∗ W + Wnew + cR/µ, and






Then if cO ≤ cO, H(i,D, N) and CO(D) never intersect as a function of D. Thus
the firm will run overtime production for any D.
If cO ≥ cO, then it is possible that H(i,D,N) and CO(D) intersect. Thus the
subcontracting policy takes a threshold structure.
However, let c̄O = arg max{cO|H(i, D̄, N) = CO(D̄)}. Then if cO ≥ c̄O, H(i, D,N)
always takes minimum for any D ∈ (0, D̄], thus the firm should not run overtime pro-
duction for any demand.
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APPENDIX C
Main Proofs in Chapter 4
C.1 Appendix
C.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: Given wholesale price ω2 and demand Q2, Manufacturer chooses q
M
2 ∈ [0, Q2]
to maximize profit:
RM2 = (P2 − cM2 )qM2 + (P2 − ω2)(Q2 − qM2 ) = (P2 − ω2)Q2 + (ω2 − cM2 )qM2
So Manufacturer produces qM2 = Q2 if ω2 > c
M
2 , and q
M
2 = 0 if ω2 ≤ cM2 . Then
Supplier’s expected profit is
RS2 = EQ2(ω2 − cS2 )Q21{ω2≤cM2 } = (ω2 − c
S
2 )Q̄21{ω2≤cM2 }
Therefore Supplier charges ω2 = c
M
2 and produces all if he can make positive profit,
i.e., if cS2 ≤ ω2 = cM2 , otherwise he will not produce anything. The outcome is as
described in the lemma.
C.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: First we examine Manufacturer’s effort decision. If his production quantity
exceeds the minimum requirement, he chooses an effort level to maximize his expected
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second-period profit subtracted by effort cost.
max
εM
{−εM + EcM2 (P2 − c
M
2 )Q̄2} = max
εM
{−εM + EδM (P2 − cM1 + gM(εM , δM))Q̄2}
= max
εM
{εM + EδM gM(εM , δM)Q̄2}+ (P2 − cM1 )Q̄2
= max
εM
{εM + ḡM(εM)Q̄2}+ (P2 − cM1 )Q̄2
Therefore Manufacturer chooses εM
e
to maximize −ε+ ḡM(ε)Q̄2 independent of Sup-
plier’s effort decision. Since ḡM is concave, εM
e
is unique.
Supplier also chooses an optimal effort level εS
e
given his anticipated Manufac-
turer’s optimal effort, i.e.,




There may be multiple εS that maximize the equation above, but since Supplier’s
actual cost in the second period does not affect Manufacturer’s profit, this will not
affect the analysis.
C.1.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: Given a wholesale price ω1 and demand Q1, Manufacturer allocate produc-
tion in order to maximize profit:
RM1 = (P1 − cM1 )qM1 + (P1 − ω1)(Q1 − qM1 ) + (P2 − cM1 )Q̄2 + GM(Q̄2)1{qM1 ≥qMmin}
= (P1 − ω1)Q1 + (ω1 − cM1 )qM1 + (P2 − cM1 )Q̄2 + GM(Q̄2)1{qM1 ≥qMmin}




(ω1 − cM1 )qM1 if qM1 < qMmin
(ω1 − cM1 )qM1 + GM(Q̄2) else
So the optimal quantity allocation is obtained by choosing qM1 from {0, qMmin, Q1}, and
the lemma follows.
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C.1.4 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: Let RS(0), RS(qMmin), and R
S(Q1) be Supplier’s expected profits if Manufac-






1 = Q1, respectively, then







1 − cS1 )(Q̄1 − qMmin) + RMS
e
RS(Q1) = 0 + R
M e
If we can show RS(0), RS(qMmin), and R
S(Q1) are all increasing in c
M
1 − cS1 , RS(0)
increases faster than RS(qMmin), and R
S(qMmin) increases faster than R
S(Q1), then there











∂(cM1 − cS1 )
≥ ∂R
MSe
∂(cM1 − cS1 )
≥ ∂R
M e
∂(cM1 − cS1 )
.
Let h(x) = max{−εS + E(x + gS(εS, δS))Q̄2}, then h(x) is convex since the maxi-
mization and expectation of convex functions are still convex. Then RS
e
= h(cM1 −cS1 ),
and RMS
e
= h(cM1 − cS1 − gM(εM e, δM)), so
∂RS
e
∂(cM1 − cS1 )
≥ ∂R
MSe
∂(cM1 − cS1 )
.





S) = −εS + E(cM1 − cS1 +
gS(εS, δS)−gM(εM e, δM))+Q̄2, and h2 = E(cM1 −cS1 −gM(εM e, δM))+Q̄2. Then for any
positive εS,
∂h1
∂(cM1 − cS1 )
≥ ∂h2




∂(cM1 − cS1 )
=
∂h1
∂(cM1 − cS1 )
|εS∗ ≥
∂h2




∂(cM1 − cS1 )
. x1 < 0 since at c
M
1 − cS1 = 0, RS(qMmin) = RMSe and
RS(Q1) = R
M e ≤ RS(qMmin), thus it is never optimal for Manufacturer to produce all
demand in house.
The condition for x2 ≥ 0 is obtained by setting RS(qMmin) ≥ RS(0) at cM1 − cS1 = 0.
138




























Supplier makes wholesale price decisions by comparing the following four options
and the equilibrium outcome follows.
RS(Q1, Q2) = 0
RS(qMmin, Q2) = (c
M
1 − cS1 )(Q1 − qMmin)
RS(qMmin, 0) = (c
M

































C.1.6 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof: (a) Based on the two-period results, Manufacturer is never hurt by Supplier’s
improvement, so (Q1 − qSmin)+ is dominated by Q1 − qSmin or Q1.
(b) Based on the two-period results, Manufacturer’s profit is independent of cS
for certain production allocation. Manufacturer benefits from Supplier’s learning
only when (qM2 , q
M




3 ) 6= (0, 0) otherwise.
If Supplier does not improve or his improvement does not benefit Manufacturer,
(Q1 − qSmin) is dominated by qMmin or Q1.
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C.1.7 Proof of Lemma 7
Proof: εS
∗
(Q2 +Q3) = arg max{−εS1 +(cM2 − cS2 + fS(εS1 ))(Q2 +Q3)+GS∗(Q3)} and






C.1.8 Proof of Lemma 8
Proof: If cM1 −cS2 < A, then cM2 −cS2 < A for any effort, and the problem is identical
to the benchmark case.
If cM1 − cS2 > A + E, then cM2 − cS2 > A if εM1 = εM ∗(Q2 + Q3). By investing more
effort the marginal benefit can only be smaller than fM
′
(εS)(Q2 + Q3).
If A ≤ cM1 − cS2 ≤ A + E, Manufacturer has two options: either improve by
εM
∗
(Q2 + Q3) or just improve to make c
M
2 − cS2 = A. The first option is better when
cM1 − cS1 < B.
C.1.9 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof:
(a) For cM1 − cS1 < A−D, cS2 = cS1 by Lemma 18, and cM1 − cS1 = cM1 − cS2 < A−D.
For cM1 −cS1 ≥ A+E, cM1 −cS2 ≥ A+E, Supplier will fully participate no matter
he learns or not. In both cases Manufacturer does not benefit from Supplier’s
learning. By Lemma 19, the problem is identical to the benchmark case.
(b), (c) For A − D ≤ cM1 − cS1 < A, if only Supplier can learn, by Lemma 18 cS2 =
cS1−∆cS(Q2+Q3) and cM2 −cS2 = cM1 −cS2 ≥ A since Supplier earns positive profit.
This brings Manufacturer extra profit (
Q2
qMmin
− 1)GM ∗(Q3). If both can learn,
cS2 = c
S
1−∆cS(Q2+Q3) and Manufacturer invests no more than εM ∗. This brings
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Manufacturer extra profit of no more than (
Q2
qMmin
−1)GM ∗(Q3)+GM ∗(Q2 + Q3).
If only Manufacturer can learn, cM1 − cS2 < A and he invests εM ∗(Q2 +Q3). The
extra profit is GM
∗
(Q2 + Q3).
For A ≤ cM1 −cS1 < A+B, if only Supplier can learn, Manufacturer does not ben-
efit. If both can learn, Manufacturer benefits by no more than GM
∗
(Q2 + Q3).
This benefit must be higher than GM
∗
(Q2 + Q3) − ( Q2
qMmin
− 1)GM ∗(Q3) since
the latter can always be achieved by investing εM
∗
(Q2 + Q3). If only Man-
ufacturer can learn, he invests εM
∗
and cM2 − cS2 < A. The extra profit is
GM
∗
(Q2 + Q3)− ( Q2
qMmin
− 1)GM ∗(Q3).
For A + B ≤ cM1 − cS1 < A + D, if only Supplier can learn, Manufacturer
does not benefit. If both can learn, Manufacturer benefits by GM
∗
(Q2 + Q3) or
fM
−1
(cM1 −cS1 +∆cS(Q2 +Q3)−A)+(cM1 −cS1 +∆cS(Q2 +Q3)−A)(Q2 +Q3) ≤
GM
∗
(Q2 + Q3), i.e., he either improves by ∆c
M(Q2+Q3) or makes c
M
2 −cS2 = A,
depending on which profit is larger. If only Manufacturer can learn, cM2 −cS2 = A,
and Manufacturer benefits by fM
−1
(cM1 − cS1 − A) + (cM1 − cS1 − A)(Q2 + Q3).
In all the above three cases, Manufacturer is better off with both learning than
with learning alone. So Manufacturer may produce Q1 − qSmin even if ω1 > cM1 .
Let ω̃ be the price such that Manufacturer is indifferent between producing
qM1 = Q1 and Q1 − qSmin, then ω̃ > cM1 .
In the benchmark case, The difference of Manufacturer’s benefits of both learn-
ing and of only Supplier learning is GM
∗
(Q2 + Q3), while in the above three
cases the difference is smaller. Let ω̄ be the price such that Manufacturer is
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indifferent between producing qM1 = q
M
min and 0. By equating two profits we
can obtain ω̄ = cM1 −
RM(both learn)−RM(only Supplier learns)
qMmin
, then ω̄ ≥ ω̄.
Manufacturer accepts a higher wholesale price than the one in the benchmark
case to give up full quantity.
Since Manufacturer is indifferent between producing qMmin and Q1 − qSmin when
ω1 = c
M
1 , the equilibrium can be obtained by comparing Supplier’s profits of four
options: (ω1 = ω̄, q
M






min), (ω1 = ω̃, q
M
1 = Q1 − qSmin),
and (ω1 = ∞, qM1 = Q1).
C.1.10 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: In the first period Manufacturer only considers four quantities: Q1, Q1 −
qSmin, q
M
min, 0. Since we have proved that only four types of quantity allocation can be
optimal in two-period problem, there are totally 16 candidates, and we can rule out
five of them:
• (Q1, qMmin, Q3) : If cM1 > cS1 , Supplier can offer ω1 = cM1 , then qM1 < Q1. Supplier
can earn positive profit in the first period and both players can be better off




1 , and Manufacturer produces everything in
Period 1, then cM2 < c
S
2 , and by Theorem 1 (q
M
min, Q3) cannot be optimal.
• (0, Q2, Q3): Supplier’s profit RS = (ω1 − cS1 )Q1 ≥ 0, implying cS1 ≤ ω1 ≤ cM1
and thus cS2 ≤ cS1 ≤ cM1 = cM2 . (Q2, Q3) is not optimal by Theorem 1.
• (Q1−qSmin, Q2, Q3), (Q1−qSmin, qMmin, Q3), and (Q1−qSmin, qMmin, 0) are not possible
by Lemma 17.
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Assuming that Demands across periods are stationary, three more candidates can
be further ruled out using two-period results:
• (Q1, 0, 0) is dominated by (qMmin, 0, 0):

















by the conditions of scenario 2. In scenario 3 and 4, cM2 − cS2 > 0 >
−GS∗(Q)
Q− qMmin




Compare Supplier’s profits of (Q, 0, 0) and (qMmin, 0, 0). By producing (q
M
min, 0, 0)
Supplier can improve and earn GS
∗
(2Q) extra profit in the last two periods. In
the first period, Supplier offers ω1 = c
M
1 and earns (c
M
1 − cS1 )(Q − qMmin) ≥
−GS∗(Q)
Q− qMmin
(Q − qMmin) = −GS
∗
(Q) ≥ −GS∗(2Q). Supplier earns nothing in the
first period by producing Q. So by producing (qMmin, 0, 0) Supplier’s profit is
higher.
• (Q1, qMmin, 0) is dominated by (qMmin, qMmin, 0):
By Theorem 1, (qMmin, 0) can be the equilibrium quantity only in scenario 2 and










3, cM2 − cS2 > 0 >
−GS∗(Q)
Q− qMmin
. If (Q, qMmin, 0) is the equilibrium quantity, then








min, 0). Since Manufac-
turer does not benefit from Supplier’s learning, cM2 are the same, so by produc-
ing (qMmin, q
M
min, 0) Supplier can improve and earn G
S∗(2Q− qMmin) extra profit
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in the last two periods. In the first period, Supplier offers ω1 = c
M
1 and earns
(cM1 − cS1 )(Q − qMmin) ≥
−GS∗(Q)
Q− qMmin
(Q − qMmin) = −GS
∗
(Q) ≥ −GS∗(2Q− qMmin).
Supplier earns nothing in the first period by producing Q. So by producing
(qMmin, q
M
min, 0) Supplier’s profit is higher.
• (0, qMmin, Q3) is dominated by (qMmin, Q2, Q3) :
(qMmin, Q3) is optimal in the last two periods only when f
M , fS satisfy conditions













. Manufacturer does not benefit
from Supplier’s learning and the equilibrium wholesale price is identical to the

















− cS1 )Q + (cM1 − cS1 )(Q− qMmin) + GS
∗
(Q− qMmin)
RS(qMmin, Q2, Q3) = (c
M
1 − cS1 )(Q− qMmin)
RS(0, q
M





− cS1 )Q + GS
∗
(Q− qMmin)


















(Q− qMmin) ≤ 0
C.1.11 Proof of Observation 1
Proof: First notice that in the second period Manufacturer never shares effort cost
since he does not benefit from Supplier’s improvement.
In the first period,
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1. Supplier’s effort decision: Given cM2 and ε
MS







0 if (qM2 , q
M
3 ) = (Q2, Q3)
(cM2 − cS2 )(Q2 − qMmin) if(qM2 , qM3 ) = (qMmin, Q3)
(cM2 − cS2 )(Q2 + Q3) + N otherwise
Since εS
∗







(Q2 + Q3)− εMS1 )+, if RS(cM2 , εMS1 , εS∗(Q2 + Q3)) ≥ 0;
0, otherwise.
.
In other word, Supplier’s cost improvement remains the same, but he only
invests the effort not paid by Manufacturer. Therefore Supplier is more willing
to improve compared with no cost sharing case.
2. Manufacturer’s effort sharing decision:
Clearly 0 < εMS1 ≤ εS∗(Q2 + Q3) does not help Manufacturer. By Lemma 18,
if cM2 − cS1 > A −D, then Supplier improves and produces full quantity in the
next two periods even without effort shared by Manufacturer, so εMS = 0.
If cM2 − cS1 < A − D, Manufacturer only benefits if he can induce Supplier to
fully participate in future periods and chooses the minimum possible effort that
makes Supplier indifferent between full participation and not participating. If
εMS > 0, Supplier always produces everything and gains zero profit. Let A−D′
be the smallest cost difference cM2 − cS1 such that εMS > 0.
3. Quantity and wholesale price decisions:
Consider A−D′ < cM1 −cS1 < A−D and close to A−D. If Manufacturer cannot
share effort cost, similar to Theorem 11, the equilibrium is identical to the











(Q2 + Q3) is the difference of Manufacturer’s profit in the last period
if both learn and if only Supplier can learn.
If Manufacturer has the option of sharing effort cost, then if only supplier
can learn, Manufacturer offers εMS to help Supplier and gains extra profit
−εMS +( Q1
qMmin





(Q2 + Q3) by assumption, Manufacturer is better off by not fully improv-
ing. The optimal effort level keeps cM2 − cS1 + ∆cS(Q2 + Q3) = A. So the
extra profit gain from learning is between −εMS + ( Q1
qMmin
− 1)GM ∗(Q3) and
−εMS + ( Q1
qMmin
− 1)GM ∗(Q3) + GM ∗(Q2 + Q3). Thus the profit difference be-
tween both learning and only Supplier learning becomes smaller, resulting a
higher wholesale price ω̄. Supplier need not offer a wholesale discount as deep
as before.
If cM1 − cS1 is close enough to A−D > 0, then the extra profit gain when both
can learn is close to −εMS + ( Q1
qMmin
− 1)GM ∗(Q3), so ω̄ is close to cM1 . If (0, 0, 0)
is the equilibrium quantity, Supplier gains profit RS = (ω̄ − cS1 )Q1 + 0 > 0.
Since ω̄ = cM1 −
1
qMmin
(RM2 (both learn) − RM2 (only S learns)), Manufacturer’s
profit can be obtained by:
RM = (P1 − cM1 +
1
qMmin
(RM2 (both learn)−RM2 (only S learns)))Q1 + RM2 (only S learns)
= (P1 − cM1 )Q1 +
Q1
qMmin
(RM2 (both learn)−RM2 (only S learns)) + RM2 (only S learns)
As mentioned above, (RM2 (both learn) − RM2 (only S learns)) becomes smaller
with effort sharing option, Manufacturer’s profit becomes smaller if Q1 is large
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